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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Economists have given considerable attention to the effect of incentives facing agents on the 
performance of economic activities. Incentives can be controlled by utilizing institutions 
such as contracts, organizations, law and other social norms, and other mechanisms that 
either explicitly or implicitly affect incentives of people involved in the transaction. The 
major objective of this dissertation is to provide empirical evidence on how incentives 
actually affect contract design from the perspective of the principal-agent framework. Using 
a large data set on farmland lease contracts in modern U.S. agriculture, I present evidence on 
how risk, transaction costs, and incentives affect contract design. Moreover, I address the 
role of matching between the landlord and tenant attributes, landlord's participation in 
management decisions, and contractual externalities in contract design. These are topics that 
have received little attention in the empirical literature. 
In the literature on farmland lease contracts, the design of contract principally 
means the choice between a cash rent contract and a cropshare contract. Under a typical cash 
rent contract, the tenant makes a fixed payment to the landlord, and the tenant takes all the 
realized output. Under a typical cropshare contract, on the other hand, the tenant and 
landlord share the realized output in accordance with the prior agreement. This kind of 
contract design can be observed in industries other than agriculture. An example is a royalty 
contract in franchising, in which the franchisee and franchiser share the realized sales or 
profit in accordance with a prior agreement. Therefore, farmland lease contracts are a great 
example that provides rich implications applicable to non-agricultural contracting and helps 
us better understand contract design and contract choice. 
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A substantial number of hypotheses have been suggested by economists to explain 
why cropshare contracts have prevailed over a very long time period and diverse stags of 
development. Among the most important hypotheses are the risk sharing hypothesis and the 
transaction cost hypothesis. Stiglitz (1974) uses a standard principal-agent model and shows 
that a cropshare contract achieves the second best welfare outcome when a trade-off exists 
between risk sharing and incentive provision. More recently, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 
1999) develop the transaction cost hypothesis, arguing that transaction costs explain contract 
design better than risk sharing. According to Allen and Lueck (1992,1993,1999), the major 
transaction costs in cropshare contracts are the cost of dividing output equally between the 
landlord and tenant, and the cost of maintaining land quality, e.g., fertility and low rates of 
soil erosion or degradation. Furthermore, using a data set from modern U.S. agriculture, 
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) conclude that transaction costs do indeed affect contract 
design, but risk factors do not have significant effects. In contrast to the findings by Allen 
and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999), Ackerberg and Boticcini (2002) conclude that risk sharing 
affects contract design in Renaissance Tuscany, Italy. Ackerberg and Boticcini (2002) 
consider the case where the tenants are matched with landlords before they contract. 
Ackerberg and Boticcini (2002) conclude that the tenant's risk preference does not have a 
significant effect on contract choice, when possible endogenous matching is ignored. When 
the endogenous matching is taken into account, the tenant's risk preference does have a 
significant effect on contract choice. Ackerberg and Boticcini (2002), therefore, conclude 
that risk sharing actually affects contract design in the farmland lease contracts. Series 
(2005) develops a simple principal-agent model that formalizes the idea of endogenous 
matching suggested by Ackerberg and Boticcini (2002). According to Series (2005), when 
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endogenous matching of the tenant with the landlord is present, the trade-off between 
incentives and risk sharing does not always occur as implied in a standard principal-agent 
model. Series's result, therefore, is consistent with the argument by Ackerberg and Boticcini 
(2002). Furthermore, this may explain why empirical supports of the risk sharing hypothesis 
were not found in many of the past studies. 
The goal of this dissertation is three-fold. First, I attempt to fill in holes existing in 
the empirical literature on farmland tenancy contract design by providing new evidence from 
a comprehensive and new data set—the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership 
Survey (AELOS). As I described in the previous paragraph, scholars disagree on whether or 
not risk sharing really affects contract design. In this dissertation, I provide new and 
convincing evidence for the role of risk sharing in farmland lease contract design. Second, I 
address the role of transaction costs, landlord's participation in management decisions, and 
contractual externalities arise from the difficulty of landlords to act cooperatively in the 
design of farmland lease contracts with a given tenant. In the United States, tenants on 
average contract with four landlords during a production cycle, and I show that these factors 
also affect contract choice in U.S. agriculture. Although the past literature on farmland lease 
contracts has principally dealt with the design of monetary compensation schemes in contract 
design, I present new evidence in this dissertation that contract design is not just a matter of 
the design of monetary compensation scheme, but also involves more complicated problems 
that broadly affect incentives. Third, when it is possible, I attempt to formalize the 
discussion of the reasons why cropshare contracts are chosen over cash rental contracts. The 
objective of using formal models is not to pursue theoretical sophistications, but rather I use 
formal models to inform the choice of empirical models applied in this dissertation. A major 
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virtue of using formal models is that we often see clear-cut implications which lead directly 
to testable hypotheses. Also, specification of empirical models based on formal models helps 
us understand how assumptions affect predictions and to narrow the focus of our empirical 
analyses. 
The rest of this dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 are 
independent papers that focus on different topics but approach the common goal stated above. 
Chapter 2, which is the paper that Wallace Huffman and I coauthored, presents the method 
and results of the empirical evaluations of the transaction cost hypothesis and the risk sharing 
hypothesis. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of contract choice using AELOS, 
in terms of a range of issues addressed in the chapter. By virtue of rich information 
contained in the data set, we carry out comprehensive analyses of contract design using 
various variables on both landlord and tenant attributes. Specifically, we find evidence that 
supports both the transaction cost hypothesis and the risk sharing hypothesis. In particular, 
we emphasize results that support the risk sharing hypothesis. This is important because 
there has not been much empirical evidence for the risk sharing hypothesis. In addition, we 
take into account endogenous matching between the tenant and landlord, and present 
empirical evidence that endogenous matching indeed occurs, and is related to contract choice. 
Chapter 3 is the paper that Brent Hueth and I coauthored. In this chapter, our 
interest is in the fact that the portion of cropshare contracts in all farmland lease contracts 
used in modern U.S. agriculture has decreased over the years, while the number of landlords 
per tenant has increased. We argue that, using a simple model, if contractual externalities 
exist among contracts, the likelihood of cropshare contracts will decrease as the number of 
contracts per tenant increases, due to non-cooperative strategic interaction of landlords. 
5 
Since it is more difficult for the landlords to elicit effort from a tenant if there exist 
contractual externalities as the number of landlords per tenant increases, the landlords need to 
offer higher-powered contracts in order to elicit efforts from the tenant. Using AELOS, we 
test the predictions derived from the model, and present empirical evidence that supports the 
model. 
In chapter 4,1 focus on the fact that the landlords are more likely to participate in 
management decisions under cropshare than under cash rent. Based on studies of double-
sided moral hazard and royalty contracts mainly in franchising contracts, I develop a simple 
model of farmland lease contracts in which the landlord does not only decide contract design 
but also decides whether or not to participate in management decisions. Using AELOS, I test 
the predictions derived from the model, and find evidence that supports the model. Finally, 
chapter 5 provides the general conclusions of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF RISK, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND 
ENDOGENOUS MATCHING IN CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE 
FROM FARMLAND LEASE CONTRACTS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 
A paper submitted to The American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
Keita Fukunaga and Wallace Huffman 
Abstract 
This article presents empirical evidence on the choice of farmland lease contracts, using data 
on landlord and tenant attributes in modern U.S. agriculture. Controlling for potential 
endogenous matching between crop type and landlord and tenant attributes, we find 
empirical supports for the transaction cost hypothesis and the risk sharing hypothesis. We 
also find that both landlord and tenant attributes, specifically their risk preferences and 
attributes that increase transaction costs significantly affect contract and crop choices. The 
results indicate that prior studies that omit landlord or tenant attributes cause inconsistent 
estimates of contract choice equation. Moreover, our results suggest that careful studies of 
matching and its role in the design of contract are needed for a better understanding of 
landlord-tenant contract choice. 
Introduction 
Contract choice in agricultural land tenancy has attracted many researchers over time. One 
of the biggest questions is why cropshare contracts prevail under diverse conditions in both 
developed and developing agriculture. While some scholars condemn cropshare as an 
inefficient system, others try to provide sound reasons why cropshare contracts are popular in 
many countries and regions under circumstances that seem to be very different. The 
hypotheses suggested are diverse. Singh (1989) argues that there are four major hypotheses 
that explain why cropshare exists: the risk sharing hypothesis, the incentive provision 
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hypothesis, the financial constraint hypothesis, and the screening hypothesis. Among these 
hypotheses, researchers have recently discussed whether evidence exists for the risk sharing 
hypothesis, which is based on the principal-agent models. The evidence is mixed. Using 
data from North America, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) find that the effects of the 
tenant's wealth, which is used as a proxy for the tenant's risk aversion, and variability in 
production on contract choice are not consistent with the risk sharing hypothesis. Ackerberg 
and Botticini (2002), on the other hand, find that the tenant's wealth has a significant and 
predicted effect on contract choice, once endogenous matching between crop type and the 
tenant is controlled. 
Researchers face the problem of limited data when they attempt empirical 
evaluation of these hypotheses. In most prior empirical studies, information on tenant 
attributes is available, but little information on landlord attributes is available. Thus, in most 
of the past empirical studies, the set of regressors has been limited to tenant attributes. 
However, as Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) argue, this could cause bias and inconsistency in 
the estimated coefficients of the contract and crop equations. 
In this article, we econometrically investigate the set of factors that explain the 
choice of farmland leasing contracts with an emphasis on testing the transaction cost 
hypothesis and the risk sharing hypothesis. In doing so, we go beyond existing empirical 
studies by using a new data set containing both tenant and landlord attributes and discuss 
how both landlord and tenant attributes affect contract choices in farmland leasing 
transactions. Using the information contained in our new data set, this article also sheds light 
on the mechanism of matching and its impact on contract choice. Specifically, we find that 
both landlord and tenant attributes affect contract choice and matching (i.e., endogenous crop 
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choice). Moreover, we find that the agents' risk preferences and transaction costs associated 
with contracts affect matching. The latter is a new empirical finding that has not been 
revealed in the past literature. Our empirical results indicate that the conventional empirical 
approach, in which either landlord or tenant attributes are included and endogenous matching 
is not controlled properly, could suffer from omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in order to 
explain our results, theoretical studies in which endogenous matching is jointly built into the 
design of contracts may be required. 
In the following sections, we first present a brief review of the empirical literature. 
In the review, we define endogenous matching and explain how it could cause bias and 
inconsistency in the estimates in the existing literature, following the argument by Ackerberg 
and Botticini (2002). Then, we present our empirical model, the data, and our empirical 
results. The last section contains conclusions and also provides a discussion of the findings 
and suggestions for future research. 
Literature Review 
The risk sharing hypothesis underlying the landlord-tenant contract choice was first 
presented formally by Stiglitz (1974). It was derived from a principal-agent model, where a 
landlord (principal) designs a contract to maximize her expected profit (utility) under tenant 
participation and incentive constraints. If both the landlord and the tenant are risk neutral, at 
least the short-run production efficiency is achieved under a cash rent contract, while less-
than-optimal production occurs under a cropshare contract. However, if the tenant is more 
risk averse than the landlord, cropshare, rather than cash rent, may be optimal. 
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) argue that transaction costs involved in land 
tenancy contracting, rather than the trade-off between risk sharing and incentives, are the 
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major determinants of contract type. Transaction costs mainly consist of monitoring costs 
(the landlord monitors the tenant so that the tenant does not overuse the land or shirk on labor 
input, timely planting or harvesting) and the cost of dividing output fairly. Let us call this 
argument the transaction cost hypothesis. Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) argue that the 
trade-off between incentives and risk sharing, emphasized in the typical principal-agent 
models, is not important and that the type of contract is chosen to minimize the transaction 
costs involved1. 
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) obtain interesting empirical results, using data 
on landlord-tenant contracts from South Dakota, Nebraska, Louisiana, and British Columbia 
(Canada). They conclude that if the landlord does not have to worry about the tenant's 
overuse of the land, then cash rent is more likely to be used. This is support for the 
transaction cost hypothesis. They also find that a higher variation in production does not 
increase the likelihood of a cropshare contract being chosen. Furthermore, they show that the 
wealth of the tenant does not affect contract choices or that the coefficient estimates have 
signs that are inconsistent with the prediction. These results contradict a common 
assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion in the tenant's utility function. Based on 
these results, they conclude that transaction cost, rather than risk sharing, is important in 
contract choice. 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) criticize the existing empirical literature, arguing 
that coefficient estimates in empirical models may be biased and inconsistent if they do not 
properly deal with endogenous matching. The authors consider the case in which risk 
preference of the tenant is an unobserved variable, and a landlord attribute (in their study, the 
type of crop) and the wealth level of the tenant are correlated with the unobserved risk 
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preference. If there is an unobservable variable that is correlated with a variable included in 
the regression, the coefficient estimate of the included variable will be biased and 
inconsistent. They resolve this problem by using an instrumental variable method and 
including a fixed effect for unobservable landlord attributes. They show that, after the 
treatment, the wealth level of the tenant has a significant effect that is insignificant when the 
problem of unobserved variables is ignored. 
The argument and the results of Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) are very important 
because some previous empirical studies ignore this problem. Allen and Lueck (1992,1993, 
1999) do not include variables that represent the landlord's attributes except for crop type. 
Moss and Barry (2002) include crop type and information on whether or not the landlord is 
opportunistic, but information on other landlord attributes (most importantly, risk preference) 
is not included. In addition, Laffont and Matoussi (1995) and Bierlen, Parsch, and Dixon 
(1999) have not included landlords' attributes (except crop type) in the contract-choice 
equation either. 
However, there are several studies that deal with the problem in different ways. 
Pudney, Galassi, and Mealli (1998) account for landlords' unobserved characteristics using a 
landlord-specific random effect. They find that the random effect has significant effects on 
the coefficient estimates, and that if it is omitted, significant biases are generated. They also 
find that when a random effect is included in the model, wealth has a significant effect on 
contract choice for some types of farms, and the sign is as the risk sharing hypothesis 
predicts. In another empirical study, Dubois (2002) considers the role of land fertility in the 
contract choice along with the effect of risk preference and transaction costs. Accounting for 
landlord unobservable characteristics by using landlord-specific random effects, he finds that 
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neither the pure risk sharing hypothesis nor the pure transaction cost hypothesis competes 
effectively with a combined model in his data. These techniques, however, do not provide us 
with any information on the effect of specific landlord attributes on contract choice. With 
better information on landlords, we can examine the role of risk in contract choice more 
precisely. 
As far as we know, only Rainey et al. (2001) and Canjels (1998 [a], [b]) include 
both landlord and tenant attributes in the contract choice regressions. Using survey data of 
landlords who leased land in selected Arkansas districts, Rainey et al. (2001) study the 
relationship between the landlord's characteristics and the type of contract that is actually 
used by the landlord. First, they find that as the tenant's financial strength becomes greater, 
the contract is more likely to be cash rent. Second, as the value of the landlord's total land 
becomes greater, the contract is more likely to be cash rent. Third, as the number of years 
that the landlord has contracted with a particular tenant becomes longer, cash rent is more 
likely to be used. Finally, greater output variance makes the possibility of a cash rent 
contract greater. These results indicate that the landlords are, in fact, risk averse. Canjels 
(1998 [a], [b]) alone use the data set of the Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership 
Survey (AELOS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USD A) to analyze contract 
choices between landlords and tenants in the United States. Using 1988 AELOS and other 
data sources, Canjels (1998 [a]) investigates the role of risk in contract choice. As a measure 
of risk, the author uses an estimate of county-level yield variability that is based on county-
level weather variability. The author find that his measure of risk has a significant impact on 
contract choice, and the sign is consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis: cropshare is more 
likely to be used in areas with higher production variability. This article offers an 
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opportunity to reevaluate the findings of these studies, and moreover, it provides new 
findings by using an extensive set of landlord and tenant attributes. Specifically, we will 
carry out joint tests on landlord attributes and tenant attributes, respectively, to see if these 
attributes jointly affect the contract choice. 
Focusing on landlord-tenant matching, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) find that less 
risk averse tenants are more likely to be matched with less risky crop production in 
Renaissance, Tuscany. Series (2005) argues that positive assortative matching, in which less 
risk averse agents are more likely to be matched with principals with less risky assets, is a 
sufficient condition for a negative correlation between risk and incentives. By including 
more independent variables in the right hand side of contract choice and crop choice 
equations than does Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), we provide a closer look at the 
mechanism of endogenous matching. As far as we know, this is the first study that 
comprehensively investigates the role of risk, transaction costs, and landlord-tenant matching 
in contract design. 
Empirical Methods 
Data and Estimation Procedure 
We use data from the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) 
to evaluate the hypotheses discussed above. AELOS is a comprehensive data set consisting 
of tenant demographic information, economic attributes and household characteristics, and 
landlord demographic information and economic attributes. Survey questionnaires were first 
sent to producers/tenants all over the United States. They were asked to answer a set of 
questions and to provide the addresses and names of their landlords. Questionnaires were 
then sent to those listed landlords. This procedure makes it possible for us to identify a 
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tenant and a landlord for every contract in the data set. In the United States, where average 
farm size has been steadily increasing, a tenant usually has more than one landlord. 
Reflecting this fact, the information for a tenant may appear more than once in our data set, 
but in combination with the information for different landlords. In other words, in our data 
set, the sample unit is not an individual tenant or landlord, but a contract between a tenant 
and a landlord. After deleting unusable observations we had a total of 61,944 observations 
(contracts) in our data set. 
We have to refine the data set further, however, for the following reasons. If a 
landlord contracts with more than one tenant and uses different types of contracts for her 
tenants, we cannot identify the type of each contract. In addition, there are observations with 
cash-cropshare contracts or other types of non-conventional contracts. We do not use a cash-
crop share contract as a category for the dependent variable, because they may be non-linear 
contracts. For example, if the landlord and the tenant use different types of contracts for 
different crops, the contract is reported as a cash-cropshare contract. Although this is a 
different practice from a linear combination of a cropshare contract and a cash rent contract 
(that is, a contract in which the payment consists of a share part and a fixed payment), we can 
not distinguish them in the data set. If we exclude these unusable observations, the total 
number of remaining usable observations is 44,515. 
One way to deal with these problems is to simply delete all of the undesirable 
observations. However, a potential problem with this deletion is that it could generate 
selection biases in the coefficient estimates when the propensity for being deleted is 
correlated with some attributes that affect contract choice. To examine the effects of this 
possibly non-random selection, we adopt the method suggested by Van de Ven and Van 
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Praag (1981). We include the sample selection correction term similar to the inverse Mills 
ratio as a repressor in the equations of contract choice. We also employ maximum likelihood 
estimation suggested by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) that accounts for the possible 
selection problem. As we will show, the selection problem is not found to be severe in our 
data, as the qualitative results (specifically, the signs of coefficients) do not change across the 
different approaches, while some effects are observed on the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients2. 
Econometric Model 
We include both landlord and tenant characteristics in our empirical model, so that we can 
hopefully mitigate the endogenous matching problem. An advantage of having a data set 
with more variables is that adding variables can reduce the probability of omitting variable 
bias. 
A probit model is used for the empirical analysis of landlord-tenant contract choice. 
The dependent variable is a discrete choice between a cash rent contract and a cropshare 
contract: cropshare = 1 if cropshare is chosen, and cropshare = 0 if cash rent is chosen. We 
specify the model in the following way: 
( 1 ) cropshare*j =a'xi + /?'y>j +y'z,y -s y 
cropshare*• is a latent variable for contract type such that 
f 1, if cropshare*• > 0 
( 2 )  C r 0 p S h a r e » =  \ o ,  i t  c r o p s h a r e ,  < V  
x, denotes the vector of tenant z's attributes; v. denotes the vector of landlord f s attributes; 
and Zy denotes the vector of other characteristics, such as the contracted acres, the total 
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market value of the land and buildings on the contracted land, and the market value of the 
tenant's dwellings on the contracted land, as well as a constant term3. The random 
disturbance term stj is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. A positive value for 
a coefficient means that an increase in the corresponding variable makes the choice of a 
cropshare contract more likely. 
Predictions of the Signs of Coefficients 
The short definitions of the variables to be used are summarized in table 1 along with the 
means and standard deviations. Note that, since we do not have the data for what crops are 
grown on the contracted land, we use farm type as a proxy for crop type. For example, if a 
tenant's farm is categorized as a grain-oilseed farm, then the contracted land is likely to be 
used for cash grain and/or oilseed production. If a tenant's farm is categorized as a cattle 
ranching or dairy farm, then the contracted land is likely to be used for pasturing or hay 
production. 
Transaction Cost Factors 
To proxy transaction cost, we use farm type dummies, the number of landlords that the tenant 
has; the number of acres of contracted land; the total value of the land; the value of farm 
buildings, and dwellings on the contracted land; the value of the tenant's dwelling on the 
contracted land; whether the landlord lives on the contracted land; whether the landlord lives 
close to the contracted land; and the average value of the Beale code for the area where the 
tenant resides. 
In grain and/or oilseed crop production, we expect that cropshare contracts are more 
likely to be chosen because it is relatively easy for tenants and landlords to divide the output 
between them, and it is easy for landlords to market their share of output (Allen and Lueck 
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1993, 1999). Since easy access to marketing channels will lower the transaction costs arising 
from marketing output for the landlords, this will encourage the use of cropshare contracts. 
On the other hand, in vegetable and fruit production, where dividing output between 
landlords and tenants is more costly, and few markets exist for the output, we expect that 
cash rent contracts are more likely to be used. 
As a proxy for landlord monitoring costs, we use a dummy variable indicating 
whether the landlord lives on the contracted land, and a dummy variable indicating whether 
the landlord lives close to the contracted land, given the landlord does not live on the land. 
Since landlords who live further away from their contracted land will have higher monitoring 
costs, the contract is more likely to be a cropshare in order to avoid overuse of the land 
(Allen and Lueck 1993, 1999). If this is the case, we expect positive coefficients for the 
dummy variables. 
The Beale codes are used as an index that measures the importance of the 
contracted land as farmland. The Beale code measures the degree of urbaneness of the 
county, and these codes range from one to nine, with one indicating the most urbanized area 
and nine indicating the most rural area. If the farmland is located in a relatively urban county, 
then the future importance of the land for farming would be reduced, because the landlord 
would have greater opportunities to use the land for non-agricultural purposes. Thus, the 
landlord would be less concerned about current land-degrading agricultural production, and 
therefore, cash rent would more likely be optimal for the landlord. Thus, the expected sign 
for the Beale code would be positive. Since data on the Beale codes are not available for the 
years between 1993 and 2003, we used the average of the 1993 and 2003 values. 
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The number of contracted acres is another proxy for transaction costs. As the 
number of contracted acres increases, the importance of the landlord to the tenant would also 
increase. The cost of opportunistic actions would be higher for the tenant and the risk of 
overuse of land when a cash rent contract is used would be lower. The expected sign of the 
contracted acres would be negative. A similar explanation can be applied to the total value 
of the land, farm buildings, and dwellings on the contracted land, and the value of the 
tenant's dwelling on the contracted plot. As the total value of the assets on the contracted 
land increases, the potential damage from the tenant's opportunistic action is higher for the 
landlord, increasing the likelihood of a cropshare contract. As the value of the tenant's assets 
on the contracted land (e.g., the value of the tenant's dwellings) increases, then the land will 
be more important for the tenant. Hence, the landlord can choose the contract with stronger 
incentives. Therefore, increased value of assets on the contracted land increases the 
likelihood of cropsharing, and an increase in the value of the dwelling for the tenant on the 
contracted land increases the likelihood of cash renting. 
According to Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999), the risk of overusing soils is one 
of the most important transaction costs. In order for us to capture the effect of this risk, we 
use county average erodibility index for the county where the tenant resides calculated from 
1997 National Resources Inventory (NRI). The erodibility index proxies the sensitivity of 
land to soil overuse. Land in a county with greater value of erodibility index is more likely 
to be sensitive for land overuse. Since Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) argue that a 
cropshare contract is more likely to be used on the land that is subject to greater risk of land 
overuse, we expect that a larger value for the erodibility index increases the likelihood of 
cropshare, from the perspectives of the transaction cost hypothesis. 
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Risk-Related Factors 
We expect, from the risk sharing hypothesis, that as the tenant becomes wealthier he/she is 
less risk averse, so that the contract type is more likely to be cash rent. Also, for the same 
reason, we expect that the wealthier landlords are more likely to offer cropshare contracts. 
While the data on a tenant's total assets are available for us, the data on the landlord's total 
assets are not. We could use, instead, the total value of the landlord's farm assets and the 
total value of the agricultural land and buildings that the landlord owns. A potential problem 
with these proxies is that, while these variables will be correlated with the value of the 
landlord's total assets, they could be correlated to the landlord's farming experience and 
knowledge, and also to the landlord's commitment to farming. If this is true, we cannot be 
sure what these variables measure. Therefore, we need to interpret the estimated coefficients 
for these variables cautiously. 
Using the USDA's county level annual yield data from 1990 to 1999, we create a 
county average weighted and standardized yield variability index. The county data contain 
the yields for com, soybeans, hay, beans, and so forth. First, we calculate the standard 
deviations of yields for each crop in each county. Second, because different units of quantity 
are used for different crops in the data set, we divide the standard deviations by the 
respective mean values in order to make our yield variability index unit-free. Then, using the 
ten-year average share of the number of harvested acres for each crop in the ten-year average 
total harvested acres in the county as a weight, we sum up the standardized deviations and 
obtain a weighted and standardized yield variability index for each county. 
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Empirical Results 
The Estimates and Interpretations 
Table 2 presents the estimates for the basic model described above and the estimates for the 
basic model with a sample selection correction term4. In table 2, the results with multiple 
crop dummies and with a combined crop dummy (whether the tenant is a grain/oilseed or a 
tobacco/cotton farm) are shown. The results do not change much across all of the 
specifications, indicating that neither the data selection nor the exact specification of a crop 
dummy affects the coefficient estimates in the contract choice equation. The maximum 
likelihood estimation that takes into account the data selection problem using a model 
suggested by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) is presented in table 3. The results are 
similar to the basic models overall and the estimated bivariate correlation coefficient is low 
(0.08) and statistically insignificant, although there are some differences observed in the 
magnitude of estimated coefficients for some variables. These findings indicate that 
selection does not affect contract choice qualitatively in our data set. Because of the 
robustness of the results of the basic models to the selection problem, we disregard the 
selection problem in the following analyses. Thus, for the interpretations below, we refer to 
the second column in table 2. 
All of the regional variables have negative and significant coefficient estimates. 
This result indicates that cash rent is more likely to be chosen in the Northeast, the Midwest, 
and the South regions than in the West region, other things equal. When the tenant farm is 
categorized as either a grain/oilseed farm, a cropshare contract is more likely to be chosen; 
and when the tenant farm is categorized as either a vegetable/fruit farm, a dairy farm or a 
farm that raises other animals, then cash rent is more likely to be chosen. This result 
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supports the transaction cost hypothesis, because in grain and oilseed production it is easy to 
divide the products between the tenant and the landlord, and for them to find markets for 
their output. When the contracted land is used for producing fruits or vegetables, landlords 
may prefer cash rent to cropshare, since landlords do not generally have ways to sell the 
received products when they cropshare. Thus, cash rent is more likely to be chosen. When 
the tenant farm is categorized as a dairy farm or a farm that raises other livestock, the 
contracted land is more likely to be used for pasture and hay production. Since for pasture 
and hay production it is more difficult to divide the products between the tenant and the 
landlord, and to find a market for these outputs, cash rent is more likely to be chosen. As 
such, the transaction cost hypothesis seems to explain the signs for the farm type dummies 
quite well. 
The coefficient estimate for the number of landlords in the contract choice equation 
is negative, as expected from the transaction cost hypothesis. If the landlord lives on the 
contracted land, or if the landlord lives close to the contracted land, cash rent is more likely 
to be chosen. This can be because landlords living further away from the land have higher 
monitoring cost, and thus it may be more difficult to monitor the tenants to avoid overuse of 
the land. If that is true, this result is consistent with the transaction cost hypothesis. The 
Beale code has a significant coefficient estimate with the expected sign. When the land is 
located in a more rural area, the contract is more likely to be a cropshare contract, because 
the future importance of the land as farmland is greater and the landlord wants to prevent 
overuse of the land. As the value of the tenant's dwelling on the contracted land increases, 
cash rent is more likely to be chosen, but the effect is statistically insignificant. The tenant's 
total assets have a negative and significant coefficient estimate, offering support for the risk 
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sharing hypothesis. The total market value of land and buildings owned by the landlord has a 
negative coefficient estimate that contradicts the risk sharing hypothesis, while the value of 
the landlord's farm assets has a positive and significant coefficient estimate that is consistent 
with the risk sharing hypothesis. County-level crop yield variability index has a significant 
estimated coefficient with the expected sign: as the variability of crop yields increases, the 
likelihood of cropshare increases. This provides more support for the risk sharing hypothesis. 
As the total value of assets on the contracted land increases, cash rent is more likely to be 
used. We are not sure how this result can be explained. 
In the basic models described above, we included the county-level crop yield 
variability index, along with farm type indicator variables (as proxies for crop types) to 
capture the effect of risk on contract choice. Since the yield variability index is constructed 
from county-level data on various crops grown in the county, some may worry that the yield 
variability effect of a specific crop grown on the contracted land may not be captured 
completely by the county-level yield variability index, but may be mixed into the farm type 
variable. In order to consider this potential problem more closely, we group the observations 
by each farm type, namely, grain or oilseed, tobacco or cotton, vegetable or fruit, beef, and 
dairy farms, and run the basic models for each group. This way, we have more homogeneous 
observations in each group, and thus, the county-level crop yield variability index will carry 
more accurate information on the effects of production variability that the tenant and the 
landlord face. 
Table 4 summarizes these results. Except for "other crops" and dairy farms, the 
signs of the coefficients for yield variability are all positive, although, for vegetable-fruit, 
dairy, and beef farms, the coefficients for yield variability are insignificant. For grain-oilseed 
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farms, tobacco-cotton farms, and farms that raise other animals, we have significant and 
positive coefficients for yield variability, indicating that as the yield variability index 
increases, a cropshare contract is more likely to be chosen. For other crop farms, the sign is 
negative, indicating that a cash rent contract is more likely to be chosen. Finally, for other 
variables, the results are similar to those in table 2. Based on these results, we conclude that 
it is likely that yield variability increases the likelihood of a cropshare contract, and the effect 
holds robust for different types of farms. Overall, we find evidence for both the transaction 
cost hypothesis and the risk sharing hypothesis in landlord-tenant contract choice. 
Should We Include Both Tenant and Landlord Attributes in the Equation? 
An essential problem of endogenous matching raised by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) is 
the omission of variables that are relevant and correlated to other variables that are included 
in the empirical model. Existing empirical studies, including Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 
1999) and Moss and Barry (2002), test for tenant attributes affecting contract choice or 
landlord attributes affecting contract choice separately, and fail to include the attributes of 
both sides simultaneously due to limited availability of the data. Here, we test separate 
composite hypotheses that tenant attributes do not matter and that landlord attributes do not 
matter, and compare these estimates with and without restrictions, to see whether there is 
significant effect on the estimated coefficients. 
Table 5 contains the estimation results of the models in which either landlord 
attributes or tenant attributes are excluded. The chi-square test statistics calculated from 
table 2 and table 5 are large enough to reject the hypotheses that tenant attributes do not 
matter and that landlord attributes do not matter. The fact that both the landlord and the 
tenant attributes jointly affect contract choice implies that omission of relevant variables in 
23 
analyses using other data sets could be problematic. Although there are no sizable effects of 
these restrictions on many of the estimated coefficients in table 5, this may be due to the 
large sample size of our data set, and bias that arises from omitting relevant variables could 
be substantial in other data sets with smaller sample size. In the following section, we 
investigate the possible endogeneity problem in contract choice. Since we know that both 
landlord and tenant attributes affect contract choice, if there is an endogenous variable 
included in the contract choice equation, which is likely correlated with landlord and tenant 
attributes, the problem of omitting relevant variables can be even worse. 
Endogeneity Problem in Contract Choice 
The analysis above overlooks any endogeneity problems in contract choice. In this section, 
we address the possible endogeneity problem, focusing on farm type dummies (as proxies for 
crop types) in contract choice that are likely to be endogenously determined. In Ackerberg 
and Botticini (2002), crop type is considered to be a landlord attribute and matching between 
crop type and the tenant's attributes is primarily analyzed, while the landlord's unobservable 
attributes are controlled using fixed effects. In this article, we explicitly allow both landlord 
and tenant attributes to affect crop choice, by including both attributes in the regression. 
As Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) argue, some attributes such as risk preference 
are inherently unobservable. Although we can use proxies for them, the proxies may be 
poorly correlated with the true values of these variables. Thus, although we believe that 
having many variables will at least mitigate the endogenous matching problem, we admit that 
there is still a possibility that the effect of endogenous matching remains. Following 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Dubois (2002), we tackle this problem by explicitly 
considering endogenous matching of crop type and tenant attributes. 
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We develop a simultaneous probit model in which the type of contract and the type 
of tenant farm are endogenous. Consider the following model: 
cropshare* = ax • crop _ typey + a, ' xn + /?, ' yjx + /, ' z.., - sijX 
^ % +A '^2 +/2 'z%2 -^2 
where crop _ type*j is a latent variable for crop choice such that 
(1, ifcrqp_f%pe;>0 
(4) cr0p 
- ^
pe
" 
= [0, if crop _ type", < 0 
cropjype is an indicator variable and cropjype - 1 if the tenant's farm type is grain oil or 
tobacco cotton, and cropjype - 0 otherwise. The random disturbance terms (sijt, sij2 ) are 
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with the mean (0,0). The specification 
follows Heckman (1976) and Lee (1981). Note that we include landlord attributes along with 
tenant attributes in the equation for crop choice. This accounts for possible endogenous 
matching between the landlord and crop type. Since at least one of the covariates in the 
model is continuous and varies great enough, the model is readily identified (Wilde, 2000). 
The results are presented in table 6. The estimated value of the bivariate correlation 
of random disturbance p is -0.47 and significant, indicating that disturbance terms in the 
crop choice equation and contract choice equation are indeed correlated. However, the 
estimated coefficients of the contract choice equation do not differ from those of the basic 
models in terms of signs. Important variables such as the crop type, the tenant's total assets, 
the erodibility index, the yield variability index and the average value of the Beale code have 
signs consistent with the basic models. In terms of magnitude, however, some differences 
are sizable. For example, the estimated coefficient for the tenant's total assets becomes -
0.0011, which is about two thirds of that in the basic model5. Although some differences are 
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found in the estimation results and there is evidence that crop choice is correlated with 
contract choice, the evidence for both the transaction cost hypothesis and the risk sharing 
hypothesis persists, even after examining potential endogeneity problems. 
We can derive some information on the mechanism of endogenous matching as 
well as the impact of the mechanism on contract choice from our results. In the crop choice 
equation, it is shown that a tenant who has a larger share of owned land is less likely to be a 
grain or oilseed farmer, or a tobacco or cotton farmer. This probably reflects the trend that a 
field crop farmer rents land in order to expand his operation and to enjoy economies of scale. 
Wealthier (and thus less risk averse) tenants are less likely to be grain or oilseed farmers or 
tobacco or cotton farmers. Tenants who have a high debt-asset ratio are less likely to be 
grain, or oilseed farmers or tobacco or cotton farmers. An increase in yield variability 
decreases the likelihood of the farm type being grain or oilseed farms, or tobacco or cotton 
farms. When the farm is located in a more rural area, as indicated by the Beale code, it is 
more likely to be a grain or oilseed farm, or a tobacco or cotton farm. Moreover, some 
landlord attributes affect crop choice. If the landlord does not live on the farm or does not 
live within five miles from the contracted land, the tenant farm type being grain or oilseed, or 
tobacco or cotton is more likely. Landlords who have a high debt-asset ratio are less likely to 
be involved in grain or oilseed, or tobacco or cotton production. 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) presented evidence that tenants who have less 
wealth (and a higher degree of risk aversion) are more likely to be matched with landlords 
who have high-risk assets (in their case, grapevine cultivation, which they argue is more 
risky than grain production), using data from Renaissance, Tuscany. Series (2005) shows 
that positive assortative matching (PAM), in which agents who are more risk averse are 
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matched with principals with many assets, is a sufficient condition for a negative relationship 
between risk and incentives. Serfes (2005) argues that the finding of Ackerberg and Botticini 
(2002) is consistent with the theoretical predictions. In our empirical results, we find 
evidence that tenants who are more risk averse are more likely to be grain or oilseed farmers, 
or tobacco or cotton farmers, although we do not have priori information that grain or oilseed, 
or tobacco or cotton production is less risky than other agricultural production. That is, we 
are not sure which type of matching, PAM or negative assortative matching (NAM), if any, is 
occurring. However, these results indicate that factors affecting contract choice, especially 
the agents' risk preferences and transaction costs among other things, also affect crop choice. 
Furthermore, this result indicates that the matching may be in fact three-sided. That 
is, landlords and tenants are respectively matched with crop type (Ackerberg and Botticini, 
2002 and Serfes, 2005 deal with two-sided matching in which landlords are matched with 
tenants). These implications regarding the mechanism of matching are interesting, although 
they need further investigation and are beyond the scope of this article. However, they still 
deserve a few more comments. Crop choice is a complicated decision in modern U.S. 
agriculture. First, of all, the profitability of a crop is obviously an important determinant, and 
production uncertainty and output and input price uncertainty should be important, too. 
Since farmers may have repeated trial-and-error attempts in order to match a crop to the local 
environmental conditions, such as weather and soil type, environmental conditions as well as 
the history of the development of local agriculture may matter. Government farm programs 
can provide some counter-risk supports to producers and landlords. A future task is to take 
these factors into account in the matching model and to carefully evaluate the role of risk and 
the agents' risk preferences in matching. 
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Conclusions 
We have examined the empirical evidence for the major hypotheses on contract choice in 
land tenancy contracts in U.S. agriculture, using a data set of both tenant and landlord 
attributes. We find evidence for the risk sharing hypothesis, which has tended to be rejected 
in past literature. Furthermore, our results support the hypothesis that both tenant and 
landlord attributes affect contract choice and crop choice, although endogenous matching 
does not significantly affect contract choice in our data. The findings that both landlord and 
tenant attributes affect contract choice and crop choice, and that the choices are indeed 
correlated imply that empirical analysis including only tenant attributes (or landlord 
attributes) in the empirical model, without properly treating the endogeneity problem, may 
generate misleading estimates. In developed agriculture like modern U.S. agriculture, in 
which landlord and tenant characteristics are likely to be heterogeneous, the failure to control 
for endogeneity could be problematic. 
As an extension of this research, it may be fruitful and interesting to explore more 
carefully how and why endogenous matching occurs and if it affects contract choice. Our 
results indicate that risk, risk preference, and transaction costs affect not only the farmland 
lease type, but also the type of crop being produced on the contracted land. Further 
development of both theoretical and empirical studies is needed in order to carefully evaluate 
this issue. If this relationship is true, the mechanism of farmland leasing should be 
understood as the conjuncture of contract choice and crop choice. This is important since a 
similar mechanism can be observed broadly in other industries: tasks are commonly allocated 
among employees based on the employer's evaluation of employees' skills and risk 
preferences, among other factors, and it is possible that contract choice is related to this task 
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allocation. Further investigation of the mechanism of endogenous matching, built into the 
mechanism of farmland lease contract choice, therefore, may provide new perspectives and 
better understandings of contracting practices. 
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Endnotes 
1 However, Dubois (2002) shows that the choice between cash rent and cropshare can be 
explained even without assuming risk averse agents, using a multi-task principal-agent 
framework. Lack of evidence for risk sharing does not necessarily mean that the principal-
agent approach is invalid. Furthermore, there have been several principal-agent models 
developed to explain how a positive relationship between risk and the agent's risk preference 
could arise. As examples of such models, see Prendergast (2002) and Serfes (2005). Serfes 
(2005) explains how a positive relationship between risk and risk preference can appear if the 
matching between the principal and agent happens before they contract. As such, a question 
of interest that we investigate in the present article is whether risk plays a role in determining 
contract type, rather than whether the principal-agent framework is valid or not. 
2 There is, however, another potential problem in our data set. We have the data on tenants 
and landlords who actually contract, but do not have data on other potential tenants and 
landlords who failed to complete a contract. Since the decision on contract choice is 
conditional upon the choice between lease-in and lease-out, estimating only the contract 
choice equation may result in estimation biases -a well known selection problem. Dubois 
(2002) and Pandey (2004) explicitly deal with the selection problem and find no significant 
effects on the results. Although we note that there remains an unsolved selection problem, 
we do not have the data to resolve it. 
3 One could ask whether the use of simple linear proxies for inherently unobservable 
parameters of interest is a valid approach. This is an important question, but has been 
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ignored in the literature. In Appendix 1, we briefly discuss this issue using a simple model. 
The main point is that we need a strong assumption for the procedure to be valid. However, 
in this article, we assume the traditional procedure works well, for analytical simplicity 
purposes. 
4 The estimation results for selection equations from which we derived the selection 
correction term are presented in Appendix 2. 
5 Interestingly, this result contradicts Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) in which the coefficient 
estimate for the tenant's wealth becomes greater (in the absolute value) after the endogenous 
matching is controlled. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sample Summary Statistics 
Variables Definitions Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
cropshare =1 if contract is cropshare, =0 if contract is cash rent 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Independent variables 
Regions 
NE =1 if location of tenant's farm is Northwest region 0.12 0.33 0 1 
MW =1 if location of tenant's farm is Midwest region 0.37 0.48 0 1 
SR =1 if location of tenant's farm is South region 0.35 0.48 0 1 
WR =1 if location of tenant's farm is West region 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Tenant's farm type 
grain_oil =1 if type of tenant's farm is grain and/or oilseed production 0.39 0.49 0 1 
tobacco_cotton =1 if type of tenant's farm is tobacco and/or cotton production 0.12 0.33 0 1 
vegetableJruit =1 if type of tenant's farm is vegetable and/or fruit production 0.08 0.27 0 1 
othercrop =1 if type of tenant's farm is other crop production 0.08 0.29 0 1 
beef =1 if type of tenant's farm is beef cattle ranching and farming 0.10 0.30 0 1 
dairy =1 if type of tenant's farm is dairy 0.15 0.36 0 1 
otheranimal =1 if type of tenant's farm is producing other animals 0.17 0.37 0 1 
croptype =1 if grain_oil=l or tobacco_cotton= 1 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Other tenant's attributes 
t_age age of tenant 51.65 12.09 18 96 
t_gender =1 if tenant is male 0.98 0.12 0 1 
t_white =1 if race of tenant is white 0.98 0.14 0 1 
indJarm =1 if type of tenant's farm is individual farm 0.63 0.48 0 1 
n_family members number of family members living in tenant's household 3.17 1.52 1 20 
tnjandlotds number of landlords whom tenant contract with 13.35 19.83 1 171 
t_total_income_net tenant's net total income ($1,000) 206.05 795.27-•16,881.52 55,087.09 
tJarm_share =1 if share of farm income in tenant's household is greater than 75% 0.50 0.50 0 1 
t_total_assets value of farm and nonfaim assets in tenant's household ($100,000) 23.86 67.53 0.00 5528.50 
t_share_owned share of number of acres of land owned by tenant (%) 29.64 26.64 0.00 99.90 
t_dwelling_value market value of tenant's dwellings on contracted land ($ 100,000) 0.08 0.31 0.00 9.63 
t_debt_free =1 if tenant has no debt 0.12 0.33 0 1 
t_da_50 =1 if tenant's farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.13 0.34 0 1 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Landlord's attributes 
l_age age of landlord 65.09 14.47 2 100 
l_white =1 if race of landlord is white 0.94 0.23 0 1 
IjiJenants number of tenants whom landlord contracts with 1.36 2.82 1 170 
l_ope_99 =1 if landlord opffated farm or ranch in 1999 0.11 0.32 0 1 
l l i v o n  J a r m  =1 if landlord lives on contracted land 0.13 0.34 0 1 
l_liv_close =1 if l_liv_on_farm =0 and landlord resides within 5 miles of 
contracted land 0.42 0.49 0 1 
IJarmJncome =1 if landlord's net farm income is greater than $25,000 0.06 0.23 0 1 
IJarm_share =1 if share of gross farm income in landlord household is 76% or more 0.08 0.27 0 1 
IJarm_assets market value of all farm assets owned by landlord ($100,000) 2.83 9.68 0.00 584.33 
l_total_value market value of all lands and buildings owned by landlord ($100,000) 5.50 137.79 -11.93 4818.55 
l_acres_owned number of acres owned by landlord (100 acres) 5.32 34.55 0.01 2552.08 
IdebtJree =1 if landlord has no debt 0.86 0.35 0 1 
IJaJO =1 if landlord's farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.05 0.21 0 1 
total_value market value of land and buildings on contracted land ($100,000) 2.76 9.55 0.00 584.33 
Other factors 
variability standardized and weighted production variability for county of tenant's 
residence 0.26 0.10 0.01 1.29 
average_beale average of Beale code in 1993 and 2003 forcounty of tenant's 
residence 4.74 2.48 0.50 9.00 
contracted acres number of acres of contracted land (100 acres) 2.17 10.91 0.01 880.00 
erodibility erodibility index for county of tenant's residence 2.68 2.72 0.00 29.14 
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Table 2. Basic Models -Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Probit Model of Contract 
Choice (Probability that Cropshare is Chosen), N = 44,515 
With Selection Term Without Selection Term With Selection Term Without Selection Term 
Repressors -Loglikelihood = 1857223 -Loglikelihood = 18573.12 -Loglikelihood = 18724.70 -Loglikelihood = 18830.50 
Intercept .4.7794*** -4.0460*** -4.7962*** -2.9371*** 
NER -1.4002*** -1.2606*** -1.6202*** -1.3514*** 
MWR -0.5707*** -0.5024*** -0.6990*** -0.5250*** 
SR -0.4634*** -0.3806*** -0.6224*** -0.4830*** 
grainoil 0.2783*** 0.3097*** 
tobacco cotton 0.0807 -0.0075 
vegetableJruit -0.1833** -0.2823*** 
beef -0.1467* -0.0454 
dairy -0.6305*** -0.7333*** 
other_animal -0.2735*** -0.3118*** 
cropjype 0.5063*** 0.5658*** 
t_age 0.0010 0.0002 0.0016** 0.0003 
l_gender -0.1404 0.0112 0.3030*** 0.0311 
t_white 0.2515*** 0.2403*** 0.2032*** 0.1876*** 
indJarm 0.0077 0.0198 -0.0174 0.0190 
n _family_members -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0021 -0.0083 
t_n_landlords -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0095*** 
t_total_income_net <0.0001** <0.0001** <0.0001 <0.0001*** 
tJarm_share 0.0753*** 0.0625*** 0.0846*** 0.0353** 
t_total_asset -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0013*** -0.0018*** 
t_share_owned -0.0034*** -0.0047*** -0.0025*** -0.0054*** 
t_dwelling_value 0.0092 -0.0136 0.0266 -0.0271 
tdebtJree 0.0458* 0.0656*** 0.0251 0.0770*** 
t_da_50 -0.0561** -0.0407** -0.0666*** -0.0398* 
l_age 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0037*** 0.0039*** 
l_white -0.0563 0.1522*** -0.2987*** 0.1508*** 
l_ope_99 0.0331 0.0380 0.0223 0.0328 
I J i v o n  J a r m  -0.0549 -0.0985*** -0.0059 -0.1115*** 
IJivjclose -0.1857*** -0.1880*** -0.1797*** -0.1978*** 
IJarmJncome 0.1462*** 0.1760*** 0.1217*** 0.1830*** 
IJarmshare 0.0004 0.0069 -0.0042 0.0113 
l_farm_assets 0.0327*** 0.0387*** 0.0229*** 0.0356*** 
l_total_value -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0018*** -0.0013*** 
I acres owned 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 
IdebtJree -0.0316 0.0006 -0.0683*** 0.0004 
l_da_50 -0.0746 -0.0463 -0.1041** -0.0514 
totalyalue -0.0349*** -0.0414*** -0.0242*** -0.0377*** 
variability 0.3583*** 0.3505*** 0.3852*** 0.3289*** 
average_beale 0.0274*** 0.0318*** 0.0198*** 0.0350*** 
contractedacres 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0016 0.0002 
erodibility 0.0745*** 0.0777*** 0.0691*** 0.0759*** 
Selection Correction Term 0.9156 1.8834*** 
Note: Three asterisks indicate the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. Two 
asterisks indicate the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level. One asterisk 
indicates the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3. MLE Probit of Contract Choice with Selection, N = 61,944 
Cropshare Chosen Being Selected 
Regressors 
-Loglikelihood = 54959 
Estimates 
Intercept -1.8079*** 0.6479*** 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
-1.3537*** 
-0.5435*** 
-0.5074*** 
-0.2373*** 
-0.1690*** 
-0.1473*** 
cropjype 0.5477*** -0.0720*** 
Lage 
t_gender 
t_white 
indJarm 
n Jamilyjnembers 
tjijandlords 
tJotalJncome_net 
tJarm_share 
tJotal_asset 
t_share_owned 
t_dwelling_value 
t_debtJree 
t da 50 
0.0007 
0.2457 
0.3423*** 
-0.0112 
-0.0076 
-0.0084*** 
<0.0001* 
0.0357 
-0.0045*** 
-0.0048** 
-0.0218 
0.0707 
-0.0449** 
0.0021** 
0.2983*** 
0.1033* 
-0.0360*** 
0.0010*** 
-0.0016 
<0.0001** 
0.0573*** 
0.0009*** 
0.0032*** 
0.0660*** 
-0.0507*** 
-0.0201** 
l_age 
l_white 
l_ope_99 
lJiv_on Jarm 
lJiv_close 
IJarmJncome 
IJarmjshare 
IJarm_assets 
ljotal_value 
l_acres_owned 
IdebtJree 
l_da_50 
total value 
0.0041*** 
0.1479 
0.0449* 
-0.1291 
-0.2045*** 
0.2006*** 
0.0202 
0.0364*** 
-0.0015*** 
0.0006 
-0.0123 
-0.0700 
-0.0384*** 
0.0002 
-0.5255*** 
-0.0041 
0.1185*** 
0.0311** 
-0.0531** 
-0.0068 
-0.0185 
-0.0004* 
-0.0004** 
-0.0884*** 
-0.0306 
0.0141* 
variability 
averageJeale 
contracted_acr es 
erodibility 
0.4040*** 
0.0329*** 
0.0003 
0.0757*** 
0.1002 
-0.0148*** 
0.0018* 
-0.0078*** 
Correlation in Disturbance 0.07670 
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Table 4. Basic Model for Each Farm Type -MLE of Probit Model of Contract Choice 
(Probability that Cropshare Is Chosen) 
Repressors 
Grain-Oilseeds Tobacco-Cotton Vegetable-Fruit Other Crops 
N= 17,485 N = 5,514 N = 3,591 N = 3,779 
-Loglikelihood = 9230.43 -Loglikelihood = 2115.65 -Loglikelihood = 985.47 -Loglikelihood = 1528.07 
Intercept -3.6894*** -5.3759 -4.1200*** -4.0456*** 
NER -1.9645*** -6.0348 -1.1378*** -2.5642*** 
MWR -0.8169*** 1.5380*** -1.0065*** -0.2461*** 
SR -0.6572*** -0.0781 -0.6422*** 0.0100 
t a g e  0.0052*** -0.0051** 0.0051* -0.0013 
tjgender 0.0046 0.3168** 0.0029 0.3908 
t_white 0.2544** 0.2615 0.3997*** 0.0934 
indJarm -0.0097 -0.0703 0.0110 0.0108 
nJamily_members -0.0194** 0.0121 -0.0326 0.0328* 
t_n landlords -0.0220*** -0.0156*** -0.0212*** 0.0198*** 
tJotalJncome_net <0.0001 0.0002** <0.0001 0.0001 
tJarm_share 0.0448** 0.0883* 0.0193 0.1640*** 
tjotal_asset -0.0051*** -0.0109*** <0.0001 -0.0103*** 
t_share_owned -0.0056*** -0.0045*** -0.0039*** -0.0059*** 
t_dwelling_value 0.0056 0.0745 -0.0367 0.0339 
tdebtjree 0.1598*** 0.0125 -0.0466 -0.2490*** 
t_da_S0 -0.0048 0.0442 -0.3100*** -0.4002*** 
l_age 0.0054*** -0.0020 0.0046** 0.0013 
l_white 0.0846 0.3296*** 0.0842 0.3489*** 
l_ope_99 0.0091 0.1016 -0.0723 -0.0396 
lJiv_onJarm -0.1347*** -0.1462** 0.0467 0.0052 
lJiv_close -0.2279*** -0.1344*** -0.0952 -0.1050* 
IJarmJncome 0.1924*** 0.0567 0.1878* 0.3714*** 
IJarmjshare -0.0216 0.0768 -0.0704 0.0427 
IJarmassets 0.1781*** -0.0055 -0.1540** 0.0273 
ltotal_value -0.0029** -0.0074** -0.0050 -0.0025 
l_acres_owned 0.0026 0.0189*** -0.0119 0.0014 
I debt Jree 0.0626* -0.0865 -0.1216 -0.1222 
I d a  5 0  -0.0386 -0.0057 0.0256 -0.1578 
total_value -0.1793*** -0.0113 0.1655** -0.0246 
variability 0.4615*** 0.9336*** 0.0160 -0.9269*** 
averagebeale 0.0236*** -0.0217* 0.0435** 0.0474*** 
contractedacres -0.0022 0.0217 0.0189 -0.0001 
erodibility 0.0549*** 0.1829*** 0.0220 0.0667*** 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Beef Dairy Other Animals 
Repressors 
N = 4,322 N = 6,641 N = 7,505 
-Loglikelihood = 1587.58 -Loglikelihood = 914.42 -Loglikelihood = 2692.71 
Intercept -1.4716*** -3.3743*** -1.7513*** 
NER -0.5607** -0.9764*** -0.4626*** 
MWR 0.2104** -0.3675*** 0.0651 
SR -0.1126** -0.3768*** -0.2687*** 
t_age -0.0050** -0.0089*** -0.0035** 
tjgender 0.5236** 0.0203 0.4634*** 
t_white 0.6580** 0.1944 0.4437** 
indJarm 0.1797*** 0.0515 0.0502 
nJamilyjnembers -0.0097 0.0507*** -0.0113 
tjijandlords -0.0006 0.0063 -0.0058*** 
tjotaljncomejiet <0.0001 -0.0005*** <0.0001 
tJarm_share 0.0473 -0.0291 0.0330 
tJotal_asset -0.0015 -0.0090*** -0.0037*** 
t_share_owned 0.0003 0.0020 -0.0006 
t_dwelling_value 0.0676 -0.0815 0.0405 
t_debtJree -0.0686 -0.3631** -0.0272 
t_da_50 0.2210*** -0.3820*** 0.1225** 
l_age 0.0013 0.0030 0.0025* 
l_white -0.1657 0.2451 -0.0103 
l_ope_99 0.1563** 0.1194 0.1635*** 
lJiv_onJarm 0.0355 0.0333 -0.0413 
lJiv_close -0.1082* -0.2520*** -0.961** 
IJarmJncome 0.2786*** 0.1164 0.1118 
IJarm_share -0.1815* 0.0025 -0.0158 
IJarm_assets 0.0075 0.0466** 0.0365* 
ljotal_value -0.0013 -0.0073 -0.0015 
l_acres_owned 0.0003 0.0147 0.0006 
l_debtJree 0.1306 -0.0978 0.0229 
l_da_50 -0.1360 0.0523 -0.0497 
total_value -0.0060 -0.0437 -0.0348* 
variability 0.3132 -0.4180 0.7469*** 
averageJ>eale 0.0117 0.0183 0.0130 
contractedacres <0.0001 -0.0135 0.0008 
erodibility 0.1009*** 0.0060 0.0615*** 
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Table 5. Specification Test of Contract Choice Equation 
(Probability that Cropshare Is Chosen), N = 44,515 
No Tenant Effects No Landlord Effects 
Repressors 
Intercept 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
-Loglikelihood = 18919.36 -Loglikelihood = 18713.34 
-4.3012*** 
-1.2923*** 
-0.4953*** 
-0.3719*** 
-3.9085*** 
-1.3207*** 
-0.5264*** 
-0.4033*** 
grainoil 
tobacco_cotton 
vegetableJruit 
beef 
dairy 
other animal 
0.3442*** 
-0.0112 
-0.3402*** 
-0.0413 
-0.7221*** 
-0.3017*** 
0.3240*** 
0.0198 
-0.2919*** 
-0.0263 
-0.7517*** 
-0.3090*** 
tage 
t_gender 
t_white 
indJarm 
n Jamily members 
tnlandlords 
tjotaljncomejiet 
tJarm_share 
tJotal_asset 
t_share_owned 
t_dwelling_value 
t_debtJree 
t da 50 
0.0005 
0.0192 
0.2725*** 
0.0186 
-0.0012 
-0.0109*** 
<0.0001*** 
0.0664*** 
-0.0018*** 
-0.0049*** 
-0.0035 
0.0642*** 
-0.0378* 
I white 
l_ope_99 
lJiv_on Jarm 
llivclose 
IJarm_income 
IJarm_share 
IJarm_assets 
lJotal_value 
l_acres_owned 
l_debtJree 
l_da_50 
total value 
0.0043*** 
0.1683*** 
0.0426* 
-0.1043*** 
-0.1969*** 
0.1994*** 
0.0249 
0.0391*** 
-0.0014*** 
0.0007 
-0.0166 
-0.0582 
-0.0406*** 
variability 
averagebeale 
contractedacres 
erodibility 
0.3842*** 
0.0407*** 
0.0006 
0.0820*** 
0.4497*** 
0.0361*** 
<0.0001 
0.0796*** 
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Table 6. MLE of Simultaneous Probit Model of Contract Choice and Tenant's Farm 
Type (Probability that Cropshare Is Chosen and that the Tenant's Farm Type 
Is Grain, Oilseed, Tobacco, or Cotton), N = 44,515 
Regressors 
cropshare = 1 cropjype = 1 
-Loglikelihood = 44966 
Estimates 
Intercept -1.3781*** -0.7588*** 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
-1.2148*** 
-0.6766*** 
-0.5973*** 
-0.2835*** 
0.7022*** 
0.5659*** 
cropjype 1.2811*** 
tage  
t_gender 
t_white 
indJarm 
n Jamilyjnembers 
t_n landlords 
tjotal incomejiet 
tJarmshare 
tjotalasset 
t_share_owned 
t_dwelling_value 
tdebtJree 
t da 50 
-0.0004 
-0.0768 
0.0960 
-0.0050 
0.0058 
-0.0116*** 
<0.0001 
0.0196 
-0.0011*** 
-0.0024*** 
-0.0224 
0.0779*** 
0.0180 
-0.0001 
0.2849*** 
0.3617*** 
0.0552*** 
-0.0682*** 
0.0117*** 
-0.0001*** 
0.0549*** 
-0.0063*** 
-0.0096*** 
-0.0342 
-0.0566*** 
-0.2612*** 
l_age 
Iwhi te  
l_ope_99 
llivon Jarm 
lJiv_close 
IJarmJncome 
IJarm_share 
IJarmassets 
ltotal_value 
Ijicresowned 
Idebtjree 
l_da_50 
total value 
0.0027*** 
0.1262*** 
0.0490** 
-0.0741*** 
-0.1484*** 
0.1874*** 
-0.0118 
0.0320*** 
-0.0013*** 
0.0005 
-0.0123 
-0.0326 
-0.0345*** 
0.0022*** 
-0.0634** 
-0.1099*** 
-0.1458*** 
-0.1702*** 
0.0725** 
0.1009*** 
0.0096 
-0.0003 
0.0006 
0.0020 
-0.1170*** 
-0.0097 
variability 
averagebeale 
contractedacres 
erodibility 
0.4685*** 
0.0193*** 
0.0010 
0.0566*** 
-0.4330*** 
0.0405*** 
-0.0037*** 
0.0577*** 
Correlation in Disturbance -0.4669*** 
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Appendix 1. Empirical Specification of the Choice between Cash Rent and Cropshare 
In the past literature, formal discussion on empirical specification of the choice between cash 
rent and cropshare has been absent. Specifically, although it has been informally argued that 
risk and the tenant's risk aversion increases the likelihood of cropshare while the landlord's 
risk aversion decreases the likelihood of cropshare, none has derived the argument directly 
from formal models. In this appendix, we explicitly derive the condition such that cropshare 
becomes more likely and show that risk and the tenant's risk aversion indeed increases the 
likelihood of cropshare while the landlord's risk aversion decreases the likelihood of 
cropshare. We adopt a simple model of contract choice. The similar models are used to 
explain the choice between cash rent and cropshare in the past literature (e.g., see Allen and 
Lueck, 1999 and Huffman and Just, 2004). 
Suppose that the output function is given by 
(Al.l) y = L + S 
where L is the tenant's effort level and 5 is an unobservable disturbance factor that follows 
a normal distribution, N(0,a2). The landlord utilizes a linear contract denoted as 
w = ay + fi. The landlord and the tenant are either risk neutral or risk averse, and the 
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficients are denoted by rt for the landlord and rt for the tenant, 
respectively. The tenant's private cost of effort is given by • k stands for the effort cost 
sensitivity of the tenant. The reservation utility of the tenant is denoted as U0. Let the 
tenant's utility function be U. Uis a concave, monotonie increasing function. The tenant's 
problem is 
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maxi 
max.{E[U (a{L + S)  + /3-  &£2/2)]} . 
Using the second order Taylor approximation, 
E[U(a(L + S)  + /3-  kL212)\  = U(E[I])  + E[U'(E[I])  •aS] + -  E[U\E[I])  • cc2S2] 
(A1.2) 2 
= U(E[I])  +  ^ U"(E[I])-a2CT2  
where E(I)  is the tenant's expected income, E(I)  = aL + f i-kl} /2 . 
The tenant's problem can be alternatively written as 
:  [U (CE)} 
where CE stands for the certainty equivalent for the tenant's uncertain income. By using the 
risk premium, RP, CE is  defined as  CE = E(/)  -  RP. 
Since U is a monotonie increasing function, the tenant's problem is equivalent to 
max{C£}. 
Now, using the first order Taylor approximation, 
(A1.3) E[U(I)]  = U(CE) = U(E[I] -RP) = U(E[I])  -  U'(E[I])  • RP 
Therefore, from (A1.2) and (A1.3), RP = -—^-^—^—^-a2a2 = -—ra2cr2. Thus, the tenant's 
2 U'(E[I])  2 '  
problem becomes 
max{£[/]-./?/•} = max^aL + /3--^k(L)2  -^a2r tcr2J.  
I Similarly, the landlord's certainty equivalent is given by (1 - a)L -  j3 -  r t  (1 -  a)2  a2  
Under these settings, the landlord's problem becomes 
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max -|(1 — a)L — /? ——(! — a)2  v^cx2  j 
s.t. 
Z* = argmax jaZ, + /?--^-&(Z)2 --^a2r ta2J 
aL* +/?-^k(L')2  - ja2r,a2  >U0  
The first constraint is the tenant's incentive constraint, and the second constraint is the 
tenant's participation constraint. 
From the incentive constraint, L* = a/k . Because of /?, the participation constraint 
holds with equality (whenever the participation holds with inequality, the landlord can reduce 
the fixed payment so that she is better off). Thus, f i -U0  -a£ +^k(L*)2  +-^a2r ta2 .  
Plugging these into the landlord's objective function, the landlord's problem becomes 
la 1 . 
A- 1 max< k 
a 2 
V2 
a2 f t<j2  — — (1 — a)2  r ta2  — U0  
Solving this problem, one obtains 
1 + b-jCT2 (A1.4) a =: 
1 + k(rl + rt)a 
Because a* is not equal to unity unless a2 - 0 or rt = 0, the optimal contract is in general 
cropshare. Let the total welfare that the landlord maximizes with the optimal contract be 
represented by ncs, where the subscript CS denotes cropshare. Now, suppose that the 
landlord obtains gains from saving transaction costs when she uses a cash rent contract 
instead of the optimal cropshare contract. Let B denote the total additional benefits under 
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cash rent. Then, the total welfare when the landlord uses cash rent instead of the optimal 
cropshare contract denoted by nc is 
(A1.5) 7ic =—- — -—r.(72 +B 
c 2 t 2 ' 
It is optimal for the landlord to use a cropshare contract if and only if 
kr2rr4 1 (A1.6) n n -ÏLlZ. i B> 0 
^ ^ 2 1 + %+/})^ 
Through straight-forward calculations, one can show that ncs - nc is monotonically 
increasing in cr2 and in rt, and monotonically decreasing in rt and in B. This is the result 
that the past literature on contract choice has implicitly relied on in order to derive testable 
hypotheses on the effects of risk and transaction costs on contract choice. Most past studies 
use very simple linear proxies for the parameters. An implicit assumption that is necessary to 
justify such empirical analyses is that (A1.6), which is a nonlinear function of the parameters, 
can be approximated as a linear function of the parameters, so that replacing the parameters 
with linear proxies should not cause serious specification errors. This is apparently a strong 
assumption, and needs to be carefully evaluated. Fukunaga and Hueth (2006) provide some 
empirical tests on this matter and find evidence for nonlinearity, while they find no 
qualitative effects of the use of linear approximation and linear proxies on the contract choice 
equation, using the 1999 AELOS. 
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Appendix 2. MLE of Probit Model of Selection 
(Probability that the Observation Is Selected), N = 61,944 
Repressors -Loglikelihood = 35878.43 -Loglikelihood = 36116.04 
Intercept -0.0204 -0.3705*** 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
-0.3174*** 
-0.1570*** 
-0.1895*** 
-0.2483*** 
-0.1817*** 
-0.1604*** 
grainoil 
tobacco _cotton 
vegetableJruit 
beef 
dairy 
other animal 
-0.0668*** 
0.1678*** 
0.2556*** 
-0.2234*** 
0.2520*** 
0.0862*** 
cropjype -0.0767*** 
tage  
t_gender 
t white 
indJarm 
nJamily members 
tji landlords 
tjotaljncomejiet 
tJarmshare 
t to ta lasse t  
t_share_owned 
tjdwellingvalue 
tdebtJree 
t da 50 
0.0018*** 
0.2723*** 
0.0219 
-0.0247** 
0.0014 
-0.0001 
<0.0001* 
0.0271** 
0.0007*** 
0.0028*** 
0.0544*** 
-0.0429** 
-0.0323** 
0.0013*** 
0.2786*** 
0.0190 
-0.0427*** 
0.0063* 
-0.0002 
<0.0001*** 
0.0558*** 
0.0009*** 
0.0032*** 
0.0588*** 
-0.0543*** 
-0.0241 
l_age 
l_white 
l_ope_99 
lliv_on Jarm 
lJiv_close 
IJarmincome 
IJarm_share 
IJarmassets 
I to ta lva lue  
l_acres_owned 
IjdebtJree 
ljda_50 
total value 
-0.0001 
-0.5462*** 
-0.0098 
0.0995*** 
0.0054 
-0.0701*** 
-0.0157 
-0.0141** 
-0.0005** 
-0.0004 
-0.0718*** 
-0.0637** 
0.0150** 
-0.0002 
-0.5571*** 
-0.0107 
0.1130*** 
0.0245** 
-0.0621** 
-0.0179 
-0.0139** 
0.0004* 
-0.0004 
-0.0543*** 
-0.0560* 
0.0151** 
variability 
averageJeale 
contracted acres 
erodibility 
0.0225 
-0.0103*** 
0.0035*** 
-0.0074*** 
0.0390 
-0.0151*** 
0.0018** 
-0.0080*** 
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Appendix 3. MLE of Probit Model of Selection 
(Probability that Cropshare Is Chosen), the State of Iowa, N = 1,212 
Repressors -Loglikelihood = 492.52 
Intercept -9.7360 
grainoil  -0.4530 
vegetableJruit -6.6150 
-0.2497 
dairy -0.8937** 
other animal -0.6683* 
Lage 0.0090* 
t_gender -0.0810 
indJarm -0.3910*** 
n Jamily members -0.0240 
tji landlords -0.0449*** 
tJotalJncome_net -0.0005 
tjarm_share -0.0287 
t total_asset  -0.0170** 
t_share_owned -0.0011 
t_dwelling_value 0.2442 
t_debtJree 0.0782 
t_da_50 -0.2866* 
0.0090** 
Ijwhite -0.2118 
l_ope_99 0.3100* 
IJivon Jarm -0.1306 
lJiv_close -0.1620 
IJarmJncome 0.1597 
ljarm_share 0.1960 
IJarm_assets 1.0919*** 
ljotal_value 0.0311 
l_acres_owned -0.0380 
l_debtJree -0.0890 
I da 50 -0.0692 
total_value -1.1753*** 
variability -1.7868 
averagejbeale 0.0643** 
contracted acres 0.1456** 
erodibility -0.0393*** 
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CHAPTER 3. CONTRACTUAL EXTERNALITIES AND CONTRACT 
DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM FARMLAND LEASE CONTRACTS IN 
U.S. AGRICULTURE 
A paper to be submitted to ajournai in the field 
Keita Fukunaga and Brent Hueth 
Abstract 
This article uses cross sectional data on the characteristics of landlords and tenants in U.S. 
agricultural markets to study the effect of multilateral contracting on contract choice. We 
find evidence that tenants who rent from a relatively large number of landlords are more 
likely to use cash-rent, rather than crop-share, rental leases. We interpret this finding in the 
context of a contract-design model with multitasking. When a tenant's labor effort is 
allocated across multiple plots of land, one landlord's contract may influence the marginal 
cost of effort for the tenant operating under another's. We show how our empirical findings 
are consistent with this sort of contractual externality, but only when the contracts of each 
tenant-landlord pair are determined in isolation. If contracts are chosen cooperatively across 
all pairs, a reverse prediction holds. Our results therefore support the hypothesis that some 
institutional or transaction friction limits the communication and redistribution needed to 
achieve a cooperative (and Pareto-efficient) outcome. 
Introduction 
Empirical study of contract choice has focused principally on bilateral arrangements, even 
when potentially there are multilateral effects. For example, a franchisor may design 
contracts with some of its franchisees to encourage cooperation, or at least to limit 
opportunities for market competition among the relevant set of franchisees. Alternatively, 
the terms offered by a construction firm to a given client may depend in part on the firm's 
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current portfolio of projects and contract terms with other clients. In each case, technological 
and market interdependencies create contractual externalities across a group of bilateral 
contracts, and possibly provide good reason for explicit or implicit multilateral contracting 
where antitrust or other legal restrictions allow. Although a number of authors have studied 
contractual externalities of this sort at a theoretical level, there is little complementary 
empirical evidence of their importance. 
In this article, we study land-lease contracts in U.S. agricultural markets where a 
typical farmer tenant contracts with 4 or more landlords. For the most part, contract design 
in this context is a simple binary choice between a cash-rent and crop-share land lease for 
each tenant-landlord pair. Although contracts are bilateral, there are clear multilateral effects 
that result from a given pair's choice. A given tenant has finite labor and capital resources to 
allocate across multiple plots of land. As a result, one landlord's decision to present his or 
her tenant with more highly powered incentives—for example, by choosing a cash-rent rather 
than share-rent lease—indirectly increases the opportunity cost for the tenant of allocating 
resources to the plots of other landlords. It is natural to hypothesize that, absent a 
cooperative multilateral contract, competition among landlords will lead to "excessive" cash-
rent contracting. Heuristically, each landlord, knowing that his or tenant faces strong 
incentives from another landlord, must him or herself offer relatively strong incentives. 
Conversely, if contracts are negotiated cooperatively among all the affected parties, we 
should expect more share-rent contracting among tenants who contract with multiple 
landlords. For a given total capacity of labor and capital, a tenant producing for multiple 
landlords must spread his or her production resources across more land. Efficient contract 
design in this context dictates that incentives to produce on any one plot of land be less 
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intense than for a tenant who produces for a single landlord. 
We test this hypothesis using data on a cross section of 44,870 contracts covering 
12,212 tenants. We find strong evidence that tenants with multiple landlords are indeed more 
likely to use a cash rent contract than tenants with a single landlord. Cooperation could be 
implemented implicitly with an appropriate set of bilateral ex ante transfers between each 
tenant-landlord pair. Unlike the settings considered by Bemheim and Whinston (1986), there 
is no institutional restriction (anti-trust) on cooperation among the relevant parties. Even 
when landlords are the relevant decision making party, there is nothing to stop the farmer 
from communicating with all landlords and implementing the transfers needed to achieve a 
cooperative outcome. Our evidence suggests that this does not happen: there appear to be 
significant transactional costs to coordinating contract choice. 
In what follows, we briefly summarize related work. We then present a simple 
model that we use to motivate our empirics. In the subsequent sections we present our data, 
empirical methodology, and discussion of results. The final section concludes. 
Related Literature and Institutional Setting 
Typically, there are a finite number of discrete contract forms that account for the majority of 
economic transactions in any given industrial sector. One widely adopted approach to 
learning about the underlying forces that affect contract design is to study the choices that 
contracting parties make among these discrete alternatives, or to study the choice of specific 
provisions within a given form. In most cases, this means estimation of a descriptive 
qualitative choice model using the characteristics of the contracting parties and the economic 
environment in which they operate as explanatory variables. Although this approach plays 
down fundamental issues involving the origins of a given discrete set of contract forms, it 
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does offer a convenient and tractable paradigm for empirical investigation of contracts. For 
recent surveys of empirical contract economics that discuss results from this and a broader 
set of approaches, see Masten and Saussier (2002), and Chiappori and Salanie (2003). Our 
contribution in the context of this line of work is to consider the effect of "common agency" 
on contract choice. 
In a seminal treatment of the topic, Berhneim and Whinston (1986) define common 
agency as a situation where, "the action chosen by a particular individual (the agent) affects 
not just one, but several other parties (the principals), whose preferences for the various 
possible actions typically conflict." Viewing common agency as one form of multilateral 
contracting, it can be distinguished from team production and other forms of multilateral 
relationships by noting that a single party takes a productive action(s) that affects the payoffs 
of many others. At least one important question arises in this context that distinguishes 
common agency from bilateral contracting: can the affected parties (the principals) cooperate 
in designing an aggregate incentive scheme for the agent? As noted by Bemheim and 
Whinston (1986), if the answer is "yes," then common agency does not introduce any further 
frictions beyond the informational problems that may exist between a single principal and the 
agent. Whether or not cooperation is possible is an empirical question that depends on the 
potential observability and enforceability of an aggregate incentive scheme (or of individual 
bilateral contracts that implement a given aggregate scheme), and on the existence of 
legislative restrictions on the communication and coordination of principals (e.g., anti-trust 
restrictions). 
For a general class of moral-hazard problems, Bemheim and Whinston (1986) show 
that a lack of cooperation among principals introduces inefficiencies beyond those that would 
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result from moral hazard alone. Dixit (1996) develops a more explicit set of results in an 
extended version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) linear contracting environment. 
Among his results, he shows that when an agent produces a separate output for each principal, 
and when effort allocated to the production of each output is substitutable, then a non-
cooperative equilibrium among principals will result in incentives that are too highly 
powered, relative to a second-best contract that is cooperatively designed by the principals. 
In effect, a lack of cooperation leads to a "third-best" outcome where there is over provision 
of incentives that results from each principal competing for the agent's effort. In such a 
setting, there are potential Pareto gains from cooperation. Morevover, it is possible to 
implement a cooperative contract without direct communication among the principals. The 
agent, in negotiating bilateral contracts, can coordinate actions and make (implicit) transfers 
across principals to achieve a second-best outcome. 
We study contracts in a setting where common agency is frequent, but not universal. 
U.S. farmers typically own some land, and rent additional land from multiple non-farming 
land owners. Moreover, there are no legal restrictions on communication across landlords. 
Such a setting presents an opportunity to observe empirically the effect of common agency 
on contract design. We do so by studying differences between the contracting decisions of 
farmers who produce for a single landlord and those who produce for multiple landlords1. As 
noted in our introduction, there are essentially two discrete contracts used to rent land for 
farm production in the United States. Either farmers and landowners negotiate an ex ante 
rental price for use of their land, with the farmer bearing all production and price risk and 
paying entirely for non-land farm inputs ("cash rent"), or they agree to a proportional sharing 
of realized production and input costs ("share rent")2. U.S. tax law treats these two contracts 
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differently because share-rent contracts typically have provisions that grant land owners a 
degree of managerial authority and say in production decisions. As a result, land owners 
with a share rental agreement are considered "materially engaged in production." Landlords 
who meet these criteria3 must pay self-employment taxes, and cannot collect social-security 
retirement benefits. This distinction provides a reason for landlords and farmer tenants to 
choose a cash-rental arrangement, even when there maybe substantial benefits from sharing 
production and price risk via a share-rental agreement. In our contract choice model below, 
we assume that a share contract is an optimally designed linear contract that may be 
dominated by a cash-rental agreement provided "private benefits" (resulting from the right to 
collect social security payments and benefit from self-employment tax exemption, and 
possibly other unobservables) to the landlord are sufficiently high. 
The theoretical arguments above suggest potential gains from coordinating contract 
choices among multiple landowners who share a common farmer tenant. Below, we adapt 
the analysis in Dixit (1996) to show that when such coordination occurs, tenants who 
produce for multiple landlords should, ceteris paribus, be more likely than a tenant who 
produces for a single landlord to use a share-rent contract. Similarly, the likelihood of any 
given farmer-tenant pair choosing a share-rent contract should increase with the total number 
of landlords who contract with the given farmer. The experiment we have in mind is 
observation of two identical tenants. One happens to be close to a single non-farming 
landowner with an acre of land, and another is close to two or more non-farming landowners, 
each with an acre of land. As an observer, what expectation should we hold about the 
relative likelihoods of the three pairs' contract choices? Holding everything else equal, the 
tenant with two landlords has more land to work, and it is second-best efficient for incentives 
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to be lower powered on each individual acre. One way this can be accomplished is by using 
share-rent leases. Absent cooperation, exactly the reverse prediction holds: for the tenant 
with two landlords, each landlord must offer relatively high powered incentives to ensure that 
the tenant work his land effectively. In this case, a landlord who might otherwise prefer a 
share-rent arrangement, will instead choose a cash-rent arrangement. 
This intuition suggests a very clear test of whether tenants and landlords are able to 
achieve second-best (cooperative) outcomes in choosing their land-rental agreements, or 
whether instead competition among landlords leads to too much cash-rental leasing. Finding 
that tenants who have multiple landlords are more likely to use a share-rent lease supports the 
cooperation hypothesis. In what follows, we develop our theoretical arguments more 
formally, and test this hypothesis. 
Theory 
The model discussed here is adopted from Itoh (2003) and was originally developed by Dixit 
(1996). We develop the model further so that we can explicitly discuss the conditions under 
which cash rent is more preferred. With the simple model, it can be shown that an increase 
in the number of landlords increases the likelihood of cash rent in the presence of contractual 
externalities, that there are structural differences in the contract choice equations between 
bilateral contracting and multilateral contracting, and that the contract choice equations is in 
general nonlinear in parameters. Formal modeling with more general settings remains to be 
our future task, although we believe that the same results are likely to hold. 
We consider the following three regimes: in regime 1, there are n landlords and each of them 
contracts with a tenant; in regime 2, there are n landlords, contracting with the same tenant 
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and choosing contract cooperatively; in regime 3, there are n landlords contracting with the 
same tenant and choosing contract non-cooperatively. 
Regime 1 One-on-one contract 
In regime 1, a tenant contracts with only one landlord. This is the standard principal-agent 
model that Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) presented. The production function is given by 
(1 )  y -L  + S  
where L is the tenant's effort level provided for the landlord, and 5 is an unobservable 
disturbance factor that follows a normal distribution, 7V(0, cr2). Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the landlords are risk neutral while the tenant is risk averse (constant absolute risk averse, 
CARA is also assumed), and the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient is denoted by r. The 
effort cost function is given by kL2/2, where k stands for the effort cost sensitivity of the 
tenant. The expression of the optimal output share for the tenant is (for the derivation, see 
Appendix 1 of Fukunaga and Huffman, 2006) 
(2) 
Regime 2 n landlords and one tenant, and the landlords act cooperatively 
Now, let us consider the case in which n(> 2) landlords contract with the same tenant. Here, 
we consider the case in which the landlords behave cooperatively. The tenant allocates his 
efforts to n landlords' plots of land. Namely, the tenant makes effort L} for landlord j. The 
production function is given by equation (1), but now we assume that y = (>',,---y„)lx„ and 
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L = (L l , - - - ,L n ) U n .  The disturbance vector S  follows a multi-variate normal distribution, 
f —2 
N(0,Q), where Q = 
0 
0 cr, 
n J 
Landlord j receives revenue 1 per unit of output. She does not receive any benefit from the 
output produced in the transaction with other landlords. Landlord j utilizes a linear contract 
denoted as wj = ayj/ + /?y., where a} = (a),• • •,a")Un and /?y == (/?],•••,P")lx„. It is assumed 
that individual landlords cannot use contracts that directly affect incentives for the tenant's 
effort for other landlords. That is, the z'th factors of the vectors a j and , a'j and are 
zero for all z ^ j. We assume this because contracts that directly affect incentives for other 
landlords seem very unusual in U.S. agriculture. Difficulty in observing the output for other 
landlords may explain the absence of such contracts. Let the tenant's private cost function be 
C(L) = UCL\ where C„„„ = 
k ks 
ks k 
ks ks 
ks 
ks 
. k > 0 and 0 < s < 1. k stands for the effort 
cost sensitivity of the tenant. The parameter s can be interpreted as the degree of the 
externalities of efforts: when s = 0, there is no externality between the tenant's efforts, while 
when s is greater than 0, externality exists and the efforts have substitution effects. That is, 
when s is greater than 0, greater efforts for one landlord increase the marginal cost of the 
e f fo r t s  fo r  o the r  l and lo rds .  The  rese rva t ion  u t i l i ty  o f  the  t enan t  i s  deno ted  a s  U Q .  
The tenant maximizes the certainty equivalent given by 
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(3) al' + YJPj- C(L) --raQa' 
M 2 
where a = a.. Solving the first order condition with respect to L, one obtains 
M 
(4) L = aC'1 
This is the incentive compatibility condition for the tenant (we assume that the first order 
approach is valid in this problem). Since the participation constraint for the tenant holds with 
equality, using the incentive compatibility constraint, one obtains 
(5) 2^=C/0-ia(C-'-rO)a' 
7=1 Z 
The cooperating landlords' problem is 
max j(i-a)Z'- £a|  
with the tenant incentive constraint (4) and participation constraint (5), where i = (1,- • -,l)lx„. 
Substituting L and (3. using equations (4) and (5), the problem becomes 
7=1 
max |(z - a)C~xa + -^a(C~1 - rQ)a '-(/0| = max jz'C~V + rQ)a '-[/0|. 
The first order condition is 
(6) z'C"1 = a(C~l + rQ). 
Or, multiplying both sides by C, 
(7) i  =  a ( I  +  rQC)  
where / is n-dimensional identify matrix. Note that OC is a positive definite matrix. Thus, 
when s is greater than zero, the arguments in the matrix become greater, and as a result, the 
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shares for the tenant, a, becomes smaller than in regime 1. To see this, assume that cr2 = a2 
for all j. Then, equation (7) reduces to 
(8) of;(l + rcrfk) + rks^ ap2 = a* (1 + r<j2k) + a* (n - \)rkscr2 =1, for all i. 
j*i 
Solving this for a*, 
(9) a — . 
l + rcr k(\ + s(n-l)) 
When s  is greater than zero and n  is greater than 1, a*  <a  . Moreover, equation (9) shows 
that a* is decreasing in n. This gives us the first proposition: 
Proposition 1. Suppose that substituting effects exist among the tenant's efforts for different 
landlords, and that the landlords cooperatively choose contract type. Then, the optimal 
share of output for the tenant becomes smaller, as the number of landlords increases. 
When the landlords cooperatively choose contract type, an increase in the number of 
landlords adds more risk to the transaction. Since the tenant is assumed to be risk averse 
while the landlords are assumed to be risk neutral, the increase in risk lowers the optimal 
output share for the tenant. 
Regime 3 n landlords and one tenant, and the landlords act non-cooperatively 
Now, suppose that there are n landlords contracting with one tenant, and the production 
function and the cost function are the same as in regime 2. The difference is that now the 
landlords do not cooperate and independently choose contract type. Define the aggregated 
n n 
incentives over all the landlords except landlord j :  A .  =^a n  Bj  =  . Recognizing that 
i*i i*j 
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the tenant's effort is given by equation (4), the tenant's certainty equivalent as in equation (3) 
is given by 
(10) l(/f. +a,)(C-' -rO)(/(. +*.)' + #. + /?.. 
Without landlord j, the tenant's certainty equivalent is 
(11) Ij/C-'-rQMy+a.. 
Therefore, the addition to the tenant's surplus when the tenant contracts with landlord j is 
(12) Aj  (C"1 - rQ)a j  + 1 as (Cl - rÇÏ)aj + ^ . 
Landlord f s expected surplus is 
(13) (,-a,)C-\^+e, 
Landlord j maximizes the total surplus arising from the bilateral relationship treating Aj as 
given: 
max jz'C-1 (A j  + or,)' - rA jQa  • ~~ a j  (C™1 + rQ)a j  j 
Recognizing the assumption that a) and /?' are zero for all i * j, this problem reduces to 
I 2 
Solving this problem, one obtains 
max -l(C-'+rQ^)(«;y 
H4) a1*** = -
^ ^ ^ A: + (»-2)^-(M-l)^ 2 1 + rcr, 
J  1  +  (m -  2)s  
From equation (14), we obtain the following propositions. 
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Proposition 2. Suppose that substituting effects exist among the tenant's efforts for different 
landlords, and that contractual externalities exist and the landlords non-cooperatively 
determines the contract terms. Then, the optimal share of output for the tenant is greater 
than in regime 1 or regime2. 
Proof. Since we know that a* < a from proposition 1, it suffices show that aÇ* is greater 
than a . We show that the denominator in af* is smaller than that in a . One can readily 
show that, in the denominator, ————^< k, which completes the proof. 
\  + {n-2 ) s  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3. Suppose that substituting effects exist among the tenant's efforts for different 
landlords, and that contractual externalities exist and the landlords non-cooperatively 
determines the contract terms. Then, the optimal share of output for the tenant becomes 
greater, as the number of landlords increases. 
Proof. We show that a f"  is increasing in n .  
/*** , /*** , 
4 L -4 L-i 
1 1 krcr2 (1 - s)s2 
kr ( l - s ) ( l  +  (n - ï ) s )<j 2  kr ( \ . - s )Q .  +  (n -2 ) s )<j 2  (1 + (n - 3)s)(l + (n- 2)s) 
1H 1 + 
l + (w - 2)^ \ + {n — 3)5 
>0, for n > 3 
Also, one can readily show af** |2 -a* > 0. These complete the proof. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 states that, when the landlords non-cooperatively choose contract type, 
contracts with higher incentives are more likely to be chosen. A lack of coordination 
between the landlords leads to inefficient competition between them, because each of them 
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tries to elicit the tenant's effort using higher powered incentive contracts. Proposition 3 
states that the power of incentives provided by the optimal contracts becomes even stronger 
as the number of landlords increases, given that there are such contractual externalities 
between the landlords. 
These results seem consistent with the hypothesis that a cash rent contract is more 
likely as the tenant contracts with more landlords, because cash rent provides stronger 
incentives to the tenant than cropshare. However, because the optimal contract represented 
by {aÇ** is not generally a cash rent contract (actually, it is the optimal cropshare 
contract, as long as 0 < a1*** < 1 ), we need more formal discussion in order to clarify the 
implications of propositions 2 and 3 and derive testable predictions based on the propositions. 
In the following, we attempt to derive a testable prediction based explicitly on the formal 
model. 
For that purpose, we use the social welfares in regime 1 and regime 3. The social 
welfare is the sum of the landlords' welfare and the tenants' welfare. In regime 1, there are n 
landlords and n tenants and each of them independently contracts. The social welfare in 
regime 1 becomes 
>i 2 k ( l  +  kr<j j )  
In the right hand side of the first row, the principal f s welfare appears in the first parentheses, 
and the tenant/ s welfare appears in the second parentheses. Since the payments are income 
(15) 
W, s; 
\ 
J 
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transfers between the landlords and the tenants, the contractual terms do not directly appear 
in the social welfare function, although, of course, they still play the central role in 
determining the social welfare by affecting the tenant's effort level. 
Similarly, in regime 3, the social welfare when the landlords non-cooperatively contract with 
one tenant is given by 
The first summation represents the sum of the landlords' welfares while the rest terms 
represent the tenant's welfare. The second term represents the welfare for the tenant who 
contracts with n landlords in regime 3. The last term represents the sum of reservation 
utilities of the n-1 tenants who are out of leasing in regime 3. 
Now, in regime 1, suppose that the landlords choose cash rent contracts. The 
optimal effort level under cash rent is \jk . In addition, suppose that there is an external 
source of gain for the landlords when they use cash rent. Examples of such an external 
source of gain are savings in self-employment tax, full receipt of social security benefits, 
potential savings in estate tax, etc. Denote such an external benefit under cash rent by 9j 
Then, the social welfare when the landlords use cash rent contracts in regime 1 becomes 
(16) 
\ 
v 
(17) 
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Similarly to the above, suppose that the landlords choose cash rent contracts in regime 3. 
The optimal effort level is now 1/k{\ + (n- l)s). The social welfare under cash rent contracts 
becomes 
(18) 
n ( 1 1 
wf = Y 
M^Â:(l + (n-l» 2 
_±^(1)2^+^. 
y 
2£(l + (n-l» J=lK 
- + 
where V \a= l  "  
1 
—raj  +0 j  
2 ' ' 
1 
x 
U)C(r~ +(»-!)£/„ 
+ (n- l )U 0  
/ 
k ( l  +  (n  -1 )  s )  k ( l  +  (n -1 )5 )  y Ixn 
Then, it is optimal to choose cash rent if and only if 
(19) 
(20) 
This reduces to 
(21) 
W{c >WV in regime 1 
W3C >W3, in regime 3 
v-1 q _j_  ^ r v-1 2 y1 1 1 
h  J + Û~2^° j ~j l2k{ \  + kr ( j 1 j )  > 0, in regime 1 
+ -
(22) 2&(1 + {n — l)^) 2 ,=1 
1.0, 
7=1 
+—Z CL >0, m regime 3 
7=1 
Based on the condition, the following propositions are derived. Define © = ^ 0.. Then, 
7=1 
Proposition 4. For sufficiently large value of s, the lowest value of 0 that satisfies the 
condition (22) is smaller than the counterpart for the condition (21). 
Proof. We show that, for sufficiently great value of s, the LHS of inequality (21) except for 
the 0 term is greater than the LHS of inequality (22) except for the 0 term so that 
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inequality (22) can hold with a smaller value of © . To show this, we note that the LHS of 
inequality (22) becomes identical with the LHS of inequality (21) when 5 = 0. Therefore, it 
suffices to show that the LHS of inequality (22) becomes greater than the LHS of inequality 
of (21) for s > s_, where £ is some sufficiently great value. Define A W3 = W3C - W3. Using 
the envelop theorem, 
8AW3 _ dW3 da dW3 
da ds 
ds 'a=a* a? 
/ i ) 
d 
1 Uo- j)(l + fw), 
2 ds 
f 1 ) 
d 
1 Ua- j)(l + %?)J 
dW3 
ds i«=i 
+—a -a 
k( 1 - s)( 1 + ns) k (  1 - s)(l + ns )  
ds 
8s 
(*-!)' 
8AW 
Thus, the sign of is the same as that of 
& 
1 
k (  1 - j)(l + ns )  
ôs 
. The sign is positive when 
s > — - — and negative otherwise. The graphs of W3 - W3 in cases of n - 2,3,4,5,6 are 
2 2 n 
shown in figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the value of W3C - W3 becomes greater than Wf - Wx 
for some sufficiently great value of s. Although the specific parameter values are used in the 
figure, the shapes and the qualitative properties are robust to other parameter values. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4 implies that, when the substituting effects between the tenant's efforts are 
sufficiently large, the domain of © such that cash rent is more preferred is narrower in 
regime 1 than in regime 3, meaning that the likelihood of cash rent contracts is greater as the 
shift from regime 1 to regime 3 occurs. 
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The next proposition claims that an increase in the number of landlords in regime 3 
increases the likelihood of cash rent. 
Proposition 5. The lowest value of 0 per contract that satisfies the condition that cash rent 
contracts are more likely in regime 3 becomes smaller as the number of landlords, n, 
increases. 
Proof. A calculation shows that the value of the LHS of the condition (22) except for the 0 
term and the risk term is increasing in n and the rate of decrease is decreasing (see figure 2). 
This implies that the smallest value of 0 per contract that satisfies the condition becomes 
smaller as n increases. This completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Because cash rent is sub-optimal from the perspective of incentives and risk-sharing, the 
inefficiency when cash rent is used becomes greater as the number of landlords increases. 
Proposition 3 above implies that the marginal increase in the loss becomes less as the number 
of landlords increases, because the optimal share for the tenant becomes closer to unity, and 
thus smaller increase in 0 is needed so that cash rent becomes more likely. 
Now, using the analysis above, we state the predictions that we test in the empirical 
analysis. First, from proposition 4, we have the following prediction: 
Prediction 1. Cash rent becomes more likely when the tenant contracts with multiple 
landlords, compared to the case in which the tenant contracts with only one landlord. 
Proposition 5 leads us to the next prediction: 
Prediction 2. Cash rent becomes more likely as the number of landlords per tenant increases, 
given that the tenant contracts with multiple landlords. 
Finally, from equations (21) and (22), we obtain prediction 3: 
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Prediction 3. The coefficients of the equation of contract choice when the tenant contracts 
with one landlord are not the same as those when the tenant contracts with multiple 
landlords. 
Data 
The 1999 AELOS is a comprehensive data set consisting of tenants' demographic 
information, economic attributes and household characteristics, and landlords' demographic 
information and economic attributes. Survey questionnaires were first sent to 
producers/tenants all over the United States. They were asked to answer certain questions 
and to provide the addresses and names of their landlords. Then questionnaires were sent to 
those listed landlords. This procedure makes it possible for us to identify a tenant and a 
landlord for every contract in the data set. In the United States, a tenant usually has more 
than one landlord. Reflecting this fact, the information for a tenant may appear more than 
once in our data set but in combination with the information for different landlords. In other 
words, in our data set, the sample unit of the data is not an individual tenant or landlord, but a 
contract between a tenant and a landlord. After deleting unusable observations and refining 
the data set, we have a total of 44,870 observations (contracts) in the data set4. The number 
of tenants in the data set is 12,212 and the average number of landlords per tenant is 4.94 (the 
standard deviation is 6.71). 
Empirical Methods and Results 
Our empirical analysis is comprised of three phases. In the first phase, we observe the 
correlation between the number of landlords and the proportion of cash rent. This provides 
us with preliminary evidence for the correlation between the number of landlords and the 
likelihood of cash rent. In the second phase, we carry out simple regression analyses to 
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examine the causal relationship between the number of landlords and the likelihood of cash 
rent. In the third phase, we evaluate the potential endogeneity of the number of landlords in 
the contract choice equation, and see if this endogeneity problem affects our conclusions. 
First, we provide preliminary evidence that an increase in the number of landlords 
is positively correlated with the likelihood of cash rent. Table 1 shows the percentage of 
cropshare by the tenant farm type and the number of landlords. When we compare the 
proportions of cropshare between bilateral contracting and multilateral contracting (upper 
half of table 1), we find that the proportion of cropshare is greater under bilateral contracting 
than under multilateral contracting, except for beef farms and farms raising other livestock. 
For beef farms and farms raising other livestock, the proportion of cropshare is greater under 
multilateral contracting, although the difference is not statistically significant. When we 
compare the proportions of cropshare between the tenants with more than one and less than 
five landlords and those with equal to or more than five landlords (lower half of table 1), we 
find that the proportion of cropshare is smaller and the proportion of cash rent is greater as 
the number of landlords is greater, except for beef farms. These results are generally 
consistent with the hypothesis that contractual externalities exist and competition among 
landlords results in greater likelihood of cash rent. 
Although this descriptive analysis shows that an increase in the number of landlords 
is positively correlated with the likelihood of cash rent, this does not necessarily suggest the 
causal relationship that an increase in the number of landlords increases the likelihood of 
cash rent. If there is a variable that is correlated with both the number of landlords and the 
likelihood of cash rent, then the positive correlation found above is not a causal but a pseudo 
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relationship. In order for us to evaluate the true relationship between the number of landlords 
and contract design, we use regression analysis. 
We specify the econometric model as follows. Consider the contract between 
tenant i and hisy'th landlord, landlord ij. We denote the type of contract between tenant i and 
landlord ij by cy, where cy = 1 when the contract is cropshare, and ctj = 0 when the contract 
is cash rent. The landlord-tenant party obtains the social welfare Wj from the transaction 
when the party chooses cropshare, while the party obtains W° from the transaction when the 
party chooses cash rent. In addition, suppose that there are exogenous net benefits when the 
landlord-tenant pair chooses a cash rent contract. Such benefits include, for example, savings 
in self-employment tax and receipt of full amount of social security payments. If landlords 
"materially participate" in production, the income from the transaction is subject to self-
employment tax. Since landlords technically participate in management under cropshare and 
are considered to materially participate in production, landlords potentially have motivations 
to use cash rent. In addition, prior to 2000, landlords age 65 and older on social security 
retirement were required to count material participation income or other earned income 
toward the maximum amount of income that they may earn before social security retirement 
benefits are reduced. The income from cash rent is generally unearned income and thus is 
not counted toward the maximum amount of income that they may earn before social security 
retirement benefits are reduced. This may also motivate landlords to use cash rent. On the 
other hand, landlords have to materially participate in farming for at least five years before 
death to be eligible for estate tax reduction. This may motivate landlords to use cropshare. 
Denote the net benefits of cash rent for landlord ij described above by 0-. We assume that 
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Otj is observed by the landlord-tenant party but cannot be observed by econometricians. We 
assume that, from the perspectives of econometricians, 9tj is a random variable that follows a 
standard normal distribution. The landlord-tenant party chooses cash rent if and only if 
From the perspective of econometricians, the probability that the party chooses cash rent is 
1 - 0(Wy -Wy), and the probability that the party chooses cropshare is Q(Wj -Wy), where 
0 stands for the c.d.f. for standard normal distribution. In the past literature, it has been 
implicitly assumed that the difference in the social welfare, Wy - Wy , can be approximated 
by a linear function of proxies for risk preference, risk, transaction costs, and other factors. 
However, in general, Wy - Wy is not a linear function of these variables. Therefore, we 
include nonlinear terms constructed from our proxies in the contract choice equation, and 
examine if there is evidence for nonlinearity. Our econometric model can be written as 
where c*. is a latent variable such that Cy = 1 when c*. > 0 and ctJ = 0 when c*. < 0, Xy is a 
vector of regressors, and /? is a vector of coefficients. Xyfi is our approximation of 
Wy - Wy . Therefore, positive coefficient estimates mean that an increase in the variable 
increases the probability that cropshare is chosen, while negative coefficient estimates mean 
that an increase in the variable decreases the probability that cropshare is chosen. The 
proxies include a tenant farm type dummy variable, the number of landlords5, tenant total 
assets, a dummy variable that indicates whether the landlord lives on the contracted land, 
landlord assets on the contracted land, county-level crop yield variability6, and county-level 
(23) 
(24) cij ~ XijP &y 
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credibility index7 among others. The definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables 
are given in table 2. 
The most important variable that we are interested in is, of course, the number of 
total landlords that the tenant contracts with, denoted by Nt. However, this variable may be 
subject to a problem of measurement error, because the true variable we want to use is the 
number of other competing landlords for a specific landlord, denoted by Ny, and Ni is not 
always an exact measurement of TV*., as we explain below. Consider the following two cases. 
In the first case, suppose that all the existing contracts are renegotiated simultaneously, along 
with new contracts, if any. In this case, TV,, minus one is equal to TV*, for all j, and therefore, 
Nt can be used as an exact measurement of Ny. In the second case, suppose that the 
existing contracts are not renegotiated once the landlord-tenant pairs set the contracts. In this 
case, Ny depends on the order of the participation of landlord ij. Ny is greater for a landlord 
who enters the transaction with the tenant at a later time. N{ is not an exact measurement of 
Ny, and we do not have an exact measure of Ny, since the data on the order of landlord 
participation are not available in our data set. Note, however, that N. is positively correlated 
with Ny even in the latter case. Because of the positive correlation, the use of TV, instead of 
Ny should still consistently capture the effect of the true variable, at least qualitatively. 
In addition to the number of landlords, we define, for each landlord, the share of the 
acres contracted by the tenant with other landlords in the total acres contracted by the tenant. 
This variable is another measurement of contractual externalities. We predict that as the 
share of total acres contracted with other landlords becomes greater, the landlord is more 
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likely to use a cash rent, because the landlord inclines to use a high powered contract in order 
to elicit tenant's effort. 
Table 3 shows the summary of the effects of the number of landlords in the contract 
choice equation. In the first column, the coefficient estimate for the number of landlords is -
0.0084 and it is statistically significant, which implies that an increase in the number of 
landlords decreases the likelihood of cropshare. In the second column where I_peer_effect is 
included, both tjijandlords and I_peer_effect have negative and significant coefficient 
estimates. An increase in the number of landlords and an increase in the share of acres 
contracted with other landlords increase the likelihood of cash rent. This result, therefore, is 
consistent with the hypothesis that contractual externalities exist, and they affect contract 
choice in a way that principals choose contracts with stronger incentives than those in the 
absence of contractual externalities. 
Next, we examine whether there exist structural differences between bilateral and 
multilateral contracting. In order to test the structural differences, we carry out the Chow-
type test (Greene, 2000). The data set is divided into two categories, depending on whether a 
tenant has only one landlord (regime 1) or multiple landlords (regime 2). Evidence that the 
estimated coefficients in the contract choice equations across the two regimes are not 
identical indicates that there exist contractual externalities in the transaction, and the 
externalities affect contract choice. The test rejects the hypothesis that all the coefficient 
estimates are identical across the two regimes8. Thus, we conclude that there exist structural 
differences in the contract choice equations between bilateral contracting and multilateral 
contracting, and this provides further evidence for the hypothesis that contractual 
externalities affect contract choice. 
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The simple probit analysis above does not consider the possibility that the number 
of landlords is endogenous in the contract choice equation. If this is true, the estimates 
shown in table 3 may be biased. There is a reason that we have to worry about this problem. 
Since bigger farmers tend to have more landlords, and bigger farmers may be less risk averse, 
the size of farm may affect both the number of landlords and contract choice simultaneously. 
Without considering this potential endogeneity problem, the coefficient estimates of the 
contract equation may suffer from bias. In order to consider the endogeneity problem, we 
take two different approaches. First, using a linear probability model, we estimate a 
simultaneous model of contract choice and the number of landlords. We first estimate the 
equation of the number of landlords, and use the predicted value to replace the number of 
landlords included in the contract choice equation. In the equation of the number of 
landlords, we include the value of the tenant's farm machineries in addition to all the 
variables included in the contract choice equation. This variable is excluded from the 
contract choice equation so that we can identify the contract choice equation. Farmers who 
own more farm machineries are likely to be bigger farmers, and thus are likely to contract 
with more landlords in order to cultivate more acres and enjoy the economies of scale. On 
the other hand, there is no obvious reason that the value of farm machineries directly affects 
contract choice, provided that the tenant's attributes are controlled by the tenant's total assets 
and other variables in the contract choice equation. Specifically, the tenant's risk preference 
is controlled by the tenant's total assets. The result is reported in table 4. Overall, the 
qualitative results look very similar across the four specifications. The signs of the 
coefficient estimate for the number of landlords and for the predicted value of the number of 
landlords are negative whether or not I_peer_effect is included. The result indicates that our 
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prediction that contractual externalities affect contract choice is supported even after the 
possible endogeneity of the number of landlords is controlled. The coefficient estimates for 
I_peer_effect have negative signs in the third and fourth columns in table 4, which provides 
another support for our prediction. As the share of acres contracted with other landlords 
becomes greater, a cash rent contract becomes more likely. 
As an alternative specification, we estimate a bivariate probit model in which 
contract type and regime (bilateral or multilateral contracting) are simultaneously determined. 
By explicitly allowing the correlation between the contract choice and the regime selection, 
we can simultaneously assess the effect of the potential endogeneity problem. In the 
bivariate probit model, we allow the coefficients of the contract choice equations in regime 1 
(bilateral contracting) and regime 2 (multilateral contracting) to differ, because we find that 
the coefficients are not identical in the analysis above. Table 5 shows the results. We find 
that the estimated correlation in the disturbance terms has a negative sign, which implies that 
the tendency of multilateral contracting is negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
cropshare, and the effect is statistically significant. This provides evidence that the regime 
selection and contract choice are correlated. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for the 
number of landlords in the contract choice equation in multilateral contracting is negative 
and significant, indicating that an increase in the number of landlords decreases the 
likelihood of cropshare under multilateral contracting. These findings are consistent with 
those in table 3. Therefore, we conclude that the negative effect of the number of landlords 
on the likelihood of cropshare is robust to the possible endogeneity problem in contract 
choice. 
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Conclusions 
Although multilateral contracting is one of the important characteristics in some areas, it has 
received little attention in the empirical literature to date. In this article, we carry out a case 
study using a data set from farmland lease contracts in U.S. agriculture. Farmer tenants often 
have more than one landlord, and multilateral contracting appears in farmland leasing in 
modern U.S. agriculture. We argue that cash rent becomes more likely as the number of 
landlords increases, provided that multi-tasking for different landlords is more costly for the 
tenant, and contractual externalities exist and coordination between landlords is absent. In 
the presence of contractual externalities, there are more landlords who provide greater 
incentives to the tenant in order to elicit greater effort from the tenant. We find that the 
number of landlords per tenant indeed increases the likelihood of cash rent contracts, and the 
result is robust to endogenous regime selection between bilateral and multilateral contracting. 
Also, we find that the structure of contract choice equation under bilateral contracting is 
different from that under multilateral contracting, which provides another evidence for the 
effect of contractual externalities on the design of farmland lease contracts. 
Although we find some supporting evidence for the effect of contractual 
externalities on contract design, the results do not necessarily insist the incentive hypothesis 
against alternative hypotheses. Especially, the result that and increase in the number of 
landlords increases the likelihood of cash rent is also consistent with the transaction cost 
hypothesis. The transaction cost hypothesis argues that, as the number of landlords increases, 
a tenant faces higher transaction costs under cropshare, because more record keeping, more 
reporting, more communications with the landlords, and greater coordination between the 
landlords are required. Transaction costs under cash rent are generally small because no 
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reporting is required and the landlord's participation in management is rare. Because of 
these reasons, the likelihood of cropshare presumably decreases as the number of landlords 
increases. 
To distinguish the effect of contractual externalities from the effect of transaction 
costs is an interesting task for future research. Having variables that are correlated with the 
transaction costs but not with contractual externalities in the regression analysis would be 
useful for this purpose. Such variables may include the average transaction costs spent by 
the tenant. Empirical evidence that the average transaction costs are increasing in the number 
of landlords would also support the transaction cost hypothesis. Variables that are correlated 
with inter-landlords relationship can be used to further test the incentive hypothesis. For 
example, if the residences of landlords are further away from each other, then it may be more 
difficult for them to cooperate, and thus contractual externalities may be greater. If this is 
true, then the average distance from each landlord would increase the likelihood of cash rent. 
To our knowledge, there are only a couple of empirical studies, including this article, that 
evaluate the effect of multilateral contracting on contract design. Further empirical and 
theoretical analyses would be therefore necessary for better understanding the effect of 
multilateral contracting on contract design. 
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Endnotes 
1 Of course, properly controlling for unobservable characteristics of farmers and landlords 
that influence both contract choice, and the decision to contract with multiple landlords, will 
be crucial in making valid inferences. This is formally analogous to "endogenous matching" 
as in Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), but where here there are potentially multiple matches. 
For our purposes, the total number of such matches represents a potentially endogenous 
variable in a contract choice equation. 
2 Further discussion of land-rental arrangements for U.S. farmland is provided by Allen and 
Lueck (1992, 1993). 
3 Formally, a landlord is materially engaged if he or she: "pays for at least half the direct cost 
of producing the crop; furnish at least half the tools, equipment, and livestock used in 
producing the crop; consults with the tenant; inspects the production activities periodically; 
regularly and frequently takes an important part in making management decisions 
substantially contributing to or affecting the success of the enterprise; works 100 hours or 
more spread over a period of five weeks or more in activities connected with crop 
production; or does things that, considered in their total effect, show that he or she is 
materially and significantly involved in the production of the farm commodities." (Hardin, 
2004; Harrison, 2004). 
4 We need to refine the data set in order to use it for analyzing contract choice. In particular, 
non-random data selection problem may affect the estimation of the contract choice equation. 
Fukunaga and Huffman (2006) find that, however, the selection problem does not affect 
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qualitative estimation result of the contract choice equation in the data set. See Fukunaga 
and Huffman (2006), pages 6-8 for the detailed discussion on the data refinement. 
5 In table 2, the mean of the number of landlords that the tenant contracts with is 13.27, 
which is much bigger than 4.94, which is the number of landlords per tenant in the 
population of tenants. Note that our interest is the population of contracts, not the tenants. In 
the data set that we use for the following empirical analyses, tenants who have more 
landlords appear more often and thus the number of landlords is inflated. Provided that all 
the landlords reported by the tenants had responded to the questionnaire, the following 
relationship holds: 13.27 -^Nf TV,. 
6 The county-level yield variability is constructed as follows. Using the USD A's county-
level annual yield data from 1990 to 1999, we create a county average weighted and 
standardized yield variability index. The county data contain the yields for com, soybeans, 
hay, beans, and so forth. First, we calculate the standard deviations of yields for each crop in 
each county. Second, because different units of quantity are used for different crops in the 
data set, we divide the standard deviations by the respective mean values in order to make 
our yield variability index unit-free. Then, using the ten-year average share of the number of 
harvested acres for each crop in the ten-year average total harvested acres in the county as a 
weight, we sum up the standardized deviations and obtain a weighted and standardized yield 
variability index for each county. 
7 The erodibility index proxies the sensitivity of land to soil overuse. The county-level 
average erodibility index is calculated from the 1997 National Resources Inventory (NRI), 
using a weight variable included in the data set. Although the weight variable is designed to 
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provide an unbiased estimate for state-level erodibility index and thus our calculation does 
not provide an unbiased estimate for the county-level erodibility index, we believe that the 
index still provides us with an indicator of county-level erodibility index that is good enough 
for our analysis. For the detailed discussion on the weight, see United States Department of 
Agriculture (2001), pages 44-49. 
8 The chi-squared statistics is 88.23, which is great enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% significance level. 
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Table 1. The Percentage of Cropshare by Tenant Farm Type 
and the Number of Landlords, N = 44,870 
Tenant Farm Type Single Landlord Multiple Landlords Difference 
Grain-Oilseed 0.36 0.31 0.05* 
Tobacco-Cotton 0.34 0.2 0.14* 
Vegetable-Friut 0.18 0.09 0.09* 
Beef 0.12 0.14 -0.02 
Dairy 0.08 0.03 0.05* 
Other Livestock 0.12 0.13 -0.01 
Note: An asterisk indicates the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2. Symbols, Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variables Definitions Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
cropshare 
regime 
Independent variables 
Regions 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
WR 
Tenant's farm type 
croptype 
Other tenant's attributes 
t_age 
t_total asset 
t_n_landlords 
tmachinery 
Landlord's attributes 
l a g e  
l l i v o n  J ' a r m  
l_total_value 
I_peer_effect 
Other factors 
variability 
erodibility 
=1 if contract is cropshare, =0 if 
contract is cash rent 0.20 0.40 
=1 if tenant has more than one 
landlord, =0 otherwise 0.92 0.27 
=1 if location of tenant's farm is 
Northwest region 0.12 0.33 
=1 if location of tenant's farm is 
Midwest region 0.37 0.48 
=1 if location of tenant's farm is South 
region 0.35 0.48 
=1 if location of tenant's farm is West 
region 0.16 0.36 
=1 if tenant farm type is grain, oilseed, 
tobacco, or cotton 0.52 0.50 
age of tenant 
value of farm and nonfarm assets in 
tenant's household ($100,000) 
number of landlords whom tenant 
contract with 
value of farm machinery owned by 
tenant ($100,000) 
age of landlord 65.09 14.47 
=1 if landlord lives on contracted land 
0.13 0.34 
market value of all lands and buildings 
owned by landlord ($100,000) 
share of acres contracted by tenant 
with other landlords (%) 
standardized and weighted production 
variability for county of tenant's 
residence 
erodibility index for county of tenant's 
residence 
51.63 12.11 18 96 
23.80 67.42 0.00 5528.50 
13.27 19.78 1 171 
3.43 5.20 0.00 150.00 
0 
5.52 34.63 -11.93 
72.00 32.24 0.00 
100 
1 
4818.55 
99.99 
0.26 0.10 0.00 
2.68 2.72 0.00 
1.29 
29.14 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Probit Model of 
Contract Choice (Probability that Cropshare Is Chosen), N = 44,870 
Without I peer effect With I peer effect 
Intercept -3.0643*** -2.8730*** 
t_n_landlords -0.0084*** -0.0061*** 
Ij)eer effect - -0.0024*** 
NER -1.4763*** -1.4620*** 
MWR -0.5420*** -0.5308*** 
SR -0.4956*** -0.4835*** 
cropjtype 0.6393*** 0.6576*** 
-0.0015** -0.0017** 
t_total_asset -0.0032*** -0.0031*** 
0.0044*** 0.0041*** 
l_total_yalue -0.0004 -0.0007** 
l_liv_on J'arm -0.0180 -0.0236 
variability 0.6080*** 0.6114*** 
erodibility 0.0817*** 0.0816*** 
Note: Three asterisks indicate the estimate is significant at the 1% level. Two 
asterisks indicate the estimate is significant at the 5% level. One asterisk indicates 
the estimate is significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of a Model of Contract Choice and the 
Number of Landlords per Tenant 
(Only Contract Choice Equations are Reported), N = 44,870 
Without / peer effect With I_peer_effect 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Intercept 0.1000*** 0.0962*** 0.1481*** 0.1558*** 
t n landlords -0.0015*** -0.0011*** 
t_n_landlords predicted - -0.0011*** - -0.0005*** 
NER -0.2518*** -0.2557*** -0.2450*** -0.2485*** 
MWR -0.1570*** -0.1576*** -0.1525*** -0.1521*** 
SR -0.1422*** -0.1438*** -0.1370*** -0.1378*** 
cropjype 0.1663*** 0.1640*** 0.1718*** 0.1702*** 
t_age -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
t_total_asset -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
l_age 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
l_total_value -0.0001* o
 
o
 8 *
 
-0.0001** -0.0001* 
l_liv_on Jarm -0.0084 -0.0089* -0.0101* -0.0113** 
I_peer_effect - - -0.0007*** -0.0009*** 
variability 0.1956*** 0.1989*** 0.1930*** 0.1967*** 
erodibility 0.0273*** 0.0275*** 0.0269*** 0.0272*** 
Note: tjnachinery is excluded from the contract choice equations to identify the equations. 
Linear probability model is used for the contract choice equations. The result of the ordinary 
least squares estimate of the number of landlords is reported in Appendix. 
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Table 5. MLE of Bivariate Probit Model of Contract and Regime Choices (Only 
Contract Choice Equations are Reported), N = 44,870 
Cropshare Chosen (Without / peer effect) Cropshare Chosen (With I peer effect) 
Bilateral Contracting Multilateral Contracting Bilateral Contracting Multilateral Contracting 
-Log Likelihood=30361 -Log Likelihood=30256 
Intercept -1.7578*** -0.9600*** -1.7586*** -0.6523*** 
t_n_landloids 
-
-0.0079*** 
-
-0.0046*** 
NER -0.8506*** -1.5814*** -0.8492*** -1.5387*** 
MWR -0.2498*** -0.6366*** -0.2523*** -0.6210*** 
SR -0.1595 -0.6117*** -0.1633** -0.5870*** 
cropjype 0.4264*** 0.5299*** 0.4021*** 0.5415*** 
tage 0.0023 -0.0015** 0.0021 -0.0016** 
tjotalasset -0.0068*** -0.0075*** -0.0070*** -0.0071*** 
l_age 0.0013 0.0046*** 0.0012 0.0042*** 
l_liv_on J'arm 0.0164 0.0104 0.0167 0.0004 
Itotalvalue 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009* 
I_peer effect - " " -0.0044*** 
variability -0.3025 0.9113*** -0.3023 0.9240*** 
erodibility 0.0637*** 0.0806*** 0.0630*** 0.0798*** 
Correlation in Disturbance -0.4546*** -0.4841*** 
81 
Figure 1. W3C -W3 as a function of s for n = 2,3,4,5,6 ( (aj, k, r) = (0.5,1,1) ) 
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Appendix. Ordinary Least Squares Estimate of Equation 
Explaining the Number of Landlords per Tenant, N = 44,870 
Without I peer effect With I peer effect 
Intercept 5.6168*** -5.0466*** 
NER 10.2533*** 7.9108*** 
MWR 1.6066*** 0.4913** 
SR 4.5782*** 3.0524*** 
cropjype 5.2647*** 3.6531*** 
(jzge 0.0457*** 0.0500*** 
t_total_asset 0.0138*** 0.0146*** 
tjnachinery 1.6580*** 1.4333*** 
l_age -0.0563*** -0.0344*** 
I total value -0.0095*** <0.0001 
l_liv_on _farm 1.2673*** 1.5377*** 
I_peer_effect - 0.1548*** 
variability -7.5886*** -6.4235*** 
erodibility -0.5152*** -0.4056*** 
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CHAPTER 4. DOUBLE-SIDED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACT 
DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM FARMLAND LEASE CONTRACTS IN 
U.S. AGRICULTURE 
A paper to be submitted to ajournai in the field 
Keita Fukunaga 
Abstract 
I develop a simple model of the double-sided moral hazard that explains the relationship 
between contract and landlord participation decisions in farmland leasing contracts. Based 
on the predictions from the model, I empirically evaluate the double-sided moral hazard 
hypothesis, using the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey. I find 
some supporting empirical evidence for the hypothesis, while I find there are other factors, in 
addition to the costs and benefits of landlord participation, that affect the two decisions. 
Most importantly, there is evidence that contract choice and landlord participation are 
correlated decisions, which implies that contract design is not just a matter of designing a 
monetary compensation scheme. 
Introduction 
Empirical literature on contract design has mainly focused on monetary compensation 
schemes. In practice, however, contracts are comprised of various terms, including a 
monetary compensation scheme, allocation of decision rights, restrictions on agent actions, 
and termination terms. In recent years, a growing empirical literature focuses on the 
interactive roles of these contractual terms. Many studies find that contractual terms are 
indeed used interactively to modify incentives faced by agents. In this article, I study 
farmland lease contracts in U.S. agriculture from the perspective of the double-sided moral 
hazard hypothesis developed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya and 
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Lafontaine (1995), and provide new evidence for the interaction between the monetary 
compensation scheme and the principal's participation in management decisions. In modern 
U.S. agriculture, landlords participate in management decisions more often when they use 
cropshare contracts than when they use cash rent contracts (Brown and Atkinson, 1981 ; also 
see table 1). Why is this so? Brown and Atkinson (1981), who first report the link between 
landlord participation in decision making and the choice of farmland lease contract type, 
argue that this is because tenants who have less entrepreneurial ability are more likely to use 
cropshare than those who have more entrepreneurial ability. Landlords are, thus, more likely 
to complement entrepreneurial inputs through participating in decision making under 
cropshare. A landlord whom I asked the same question provided a different perspective, 
however. He said that there is no reason for the landlord to participate in decision making 
under a cash rent contract, because the payment to the landlord does not change anyway. 
More precisely, the landlord has no incentive to participate in production decisions under a 
cash rent contract, because such an effort is not rewarded, at least in the short term, in which 
the payments to the landlord do not generally depend on the realized outcome. If this is true, 
the decisions on landlord participation and contract type should be endogenous. Specifically, 
focusing on the possible double-sided moral hazard problem as stated above, one would 
argue that if both the landlord and tenant participate in production, then cropshare would be 
optimal (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995), and that if the landlord does not participate in 
production and the tenant makes decisions solely, then cash rent would be optimal. 
In this article, I test this hypothesis using a data set of farmland lease contracts in 
U.S. agriculture, which consists of 44,515 contracts covering 12,212 tenants, and find some 
evidence for the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis. In doing so, I adopt a simple model 
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of double-sided moral hazard, in which landlord participation and contract choice are 
endogenized decisions, and fit an empirical version of the model. In this way, I clarify the 
motivation for the empirical evaluation of the interaction between landlord participation and 
contract decisions. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of 
related literature. Then, I briefly discuss the relationship between landlord participation in 
production and contract choice. Following that, I develop a simple model that explains the 
relationship between landlord participation and contract choice, and state testable predictions 
derived from the model. Then, I carry out an empirical examination of the predictions and 
present evidence on factors that affect landlord decisions and contract choices. In the last 
section, I provide discussions of the results and suggestions for future research. 
Related Literature 
There are a number of empirical studies on contract design in franchising. Most of this 
literature discusses how moral hazard, risk, and capital constraint, among other factors, affect 
the propensity of franchising in various industries. The main interest of the literature has 
been in determinants of the monetary compensation scheme. According to Lafontaine and 
S lade (2001), who provide a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on contract 
design in franchising, the main interests include the role of the trade-off between risk sharing 
and incentives in contracting (Lafontaine, 1992), the relationship between the importance of 
the agent effort and the contract type (Norton, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992; Shepard, 1993; Slade, 
1996), and the relationship between monitoring cost and contract type (Lafontaine, 1992; 
Scott, 1995). Lafontaine (1992) finds that the propensity of franchising increases as the 
importance of the franchisee's effort increases, while the propensity of owner-operation 
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increases as the importance of franchisor effort increases. Based on empirical results that are 
consistent with the prediction from the principal-agent model of double-sided moral hazard, 
Lafontaine (1992) argues that the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis explains the 
empirical findings better than the pure risk sharing and the capital constraint hypotheses. 
Although the monetary compensation scheme has been the main focus of the 
literature, contracts in practice have very complicated aspects, with both formally specified 
terms and unspecified but informally agreed upon terms between the principal and agent. 
These formal contract terms and informal agreements are possibly interactively used to 
control incentives optimally. Some of the recent literature has begun to investigate various 
incentive devices involved in contract design other than the monetary compensation scheme 
and interactions among the devices. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), using data from venture 
capital contracts, study the allocation of decision rights. They find that higher incentives are 
provided to the agent under the monetary compensation scheme when greater control is given 
to the principal. Thus, they conclude that the high-powered monetary compensation scheme 
and principal control are complementary. Using the data from automobile sales contracts, 
Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez (2001) find that the monetary compensation scheme and 
the allocation of decision rights in various areas are correlated. Specifically, they find that 
more monitoring intensity covaries with stronger incentives, which they argue is consistent 
with what the agency theory predicts. Brickley (1999), using the data from franchising, finds 
that restrictions on passive ownership, area development plans, and mandatory advertising 
expenditures specified in franchising contracts are most likely when there are significant 
externalities among the units within the franchising system, and that the contract terms are 
complements. 
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Unlike the allocation of decision rights and restrictions on the agent's activities in 
franchising contracts, landlord participation in agricultural production is not, in general, 
formalized in farmland lease contracts. Similarly, eviction terms are not formally specified 
in many farmland lease contracts, but evidence exists that they affect contract choices in 
West Bengal, India (Benerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak, 2002). Moreover, Ackerberg and 
Botticini (2002) find that pre-contract matching between the landlord and tenant is correlated 
with the choice of the monetary compensation scheme in Renaissance Tuscany, Italy1. Using 
a simple agency model with principal-agent matching, Series (2005) shows that such a 
matching mechanism between principals and agents can work as a sort of risk allocation 
mechanism and, as a result, affects monetary compensation schemes in contracts between 
principals and agents. These studies indicate that focusing solely on the monetary 
compensation mechanism in contracts may be misleading, and that it is important to analyze 
it together with other aspects of contract design. 
There have been several studies focusing on the role of the principal's participation 
in decision making in farmland lease contract choices from a different, but related, 
perspective. Rao (1971) argues that cropshare is a tenant's first step up an agricultural ladder, 
and that as the tenant acquires entrepreneurial abilities, he then becomes a cash rent tenant, 
and finally, becomes an owner-operator. Hallagan (1978) argues that tenants with greater 
entrepreneurial ability are more likely to choose cash rent, while tenants with less 
entrepreneurial ability are more likely to choose cropshare. Thus, Hallagan (1978) suggests 
that contract choice can be used as a selection mechanism when tenants are endowed with 
different abilities. Using data on 314 farmers in the United States, Brown and Atkinson 
(1981) observe the unconditional correlation between the number of decisions made by the 
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tenant and the contract type, and find that more decisions are made by the tenant under cash 
rent than under cropshare. Based on this result, Brown and Atkinson (1981) agree that 
managerial ability plays an important role in determining contract type, as Rao (1971) and 
Hallagan (1978) argue. However, Brown and Atkinson (1981) simply observe the 
correlation between the number of decisions that the tenant makes and the contract type, and 
thus, the true conditional relationship between the number of decisions and the contract type 
is not revealed. Furthermore, they do not provide evidence on the determinants of tenant 
decisions and contract choice. 
Formalizing the idea of Rao (1971), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) consider a model 
in which agricultural production requires managerial and labor inputs, and the landlord and 
tenant can jointly provide these inputs. The authors assume that a cash rent contract is 
chosen when the tenant provides both managerial and labor inputs, a wage contract is chosen 
when the landlord provides both inputs, and a cropshare contract is chosen when the landlord 
provides managerial inputs and the tenant provides labor inputs. Considering the three cases, 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) find that a cropshare contract is likely to be chosen when the 
landlord's endowment of managerial ability is relatively large compared to the tenant's 
endowment, but a cash rent contract becomes more likely as the difference becomes smaller. 
A limitation of the Eswaran and Kotwal model is that the link between the contract type and 
who provides what inputs is fixed by assumption, and thus, their model does not explain why 
a cropshare contract emerges when the landlord provides managerial inputs and the tenant 
provides labor inputs. Partially filling this void, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) show 
that, when the production function requires inputs from both the principal and agent, a 
cropshare contract is the optimal choice, even if both the principal and agent are risk neutral. 
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The assumption that the production function requires inputs from both the principal and 
agent is reasonable in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), because their interest is in 
franchising in the non-agricultural sector, where inputs from both the principal and the agent 
are crucial in many cases: the principals are often responsible for advertising and brand 
image strategy, while the agents are responsible for daily store management. In farmland 
tenancy, however, this assumption may be unreasonable, since either the landlord or tenant 
can be fully responsible for all of the tasks such as crop choice, timing of seeding and 
harvesting, fertilizer choice, etc. In fact, tenants are fully responsible for production under 
cash rent in many cases, as table 1 shows. In order for us to fully discuss the relationship 
between contract choice and landlord participation in farmland tenancy, it is necessary to 
extend the Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine model (1995) in a way that makes landlord 
participation endogenous, where the landlord not only chooses contract type, but also decides 
whether he/she provides inputs (most likely, managerial input). 
Contract Choice and Landlord Participation in Modern U.S. Agriculture 
In modern U.S. agriculture, two major reasons seem to exist for landlords wanting to 
participate in decision making, even though landlord participation may not be as crucial as in 
franchising. One of the reasons is maximizing current production, as in Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1985) and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995). The landlord may have better information 
on the contracted land and local natural conditions than the tenant, and thus, the landlord may 
be able to improve current production by participating in managerial decisions. The other 
reason is for maintaining land quality. From the perspective of the transaction cost 
hypothesis, maintaining land quality is an important issue for landlords when they delegate 
farming to the tenants (Allen and Lueck, 1992, 1993, 1999; Dubois, 2002). Dubois (2002), 
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formalizing this argument in a dynamic principal-agent model, shows that a cropshare 
contract is optimal in the case where the landlord cannot monitor the tenant's actions. In 
reality, however, the landlord may be able to influence tenant action by some amount of 
monitoring and/or participating in decision making, and such landlord action may affect 
contract choice. Specifically, if the risk of land degradation is substantial, then the landlord 
would be more likely to participate in production decisions so as to avoid land overuse. 
There have been substantial discussions over time on the reasons that cropshare 
contracts have prevailed in agriculture in various locations and stages of development. 
Among the major hypotheses, risk sharing between the landlord and tenant (Stiglitz, 1974), 
transaction costs (Allen and Lueck, 1992, 1993, 1999; Dubois, 2002), and double-sided 
moral hazard (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995, on royalty 
contracts in franchising) are well-known. However, there have been few empirical studies 
that shed light on the relationship between landlord participation in management and contract 
choice. To my knowledge, Brown and Atkinson (1981) is an only exception that discusses 
the link between landlord participation and contract choice. Provided that the landlord can 
affect tenant actions not only by choosing contract type but also by participating in 
management, focusing only on contract choice could generate misleading results in the 
empirical analysis of contract choice. 
Model 
In order to evaluate the link between landlord participation and contract choice, I consider a 
simple model of double-sided moral hazard in which the landlord not only chooses the 
contract type, but decides whether or not he/she will participate in production. In the model, 
I follow the same spirit as in Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 
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(1995), arguing that the current production function has two arguments: landlord input and 
tenant input. Using the model, I state the condition under which the landlord decides to 
participate in management, and show that a cropshare contract is chosen when the landlord 
participates in management, while a cash rent contract is chosen when the landlord does not 
participate in management. Although I do not explicitly deal with maintenance of land 
quality in the model, I present some evidence of the role of this matter in the landlord 
participation decision in the empirical analysis. 
In the following, I develop a modified version of the Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 
model (1995). The production function/has two arguments, the landlord's effort, L, and the 
tenant's effort, I. Namely, production y is given by y = f(L,l) + s, where s represents an 
unobservable disturbance factor in production. The usual properties of the production 
function (that is, increasing in both inputs, and concavity) are assumed. The landlord cannot 
observe the tenant's effort, and the tenant cannot observe the landlord's effort. The landlord 
and the tenant are both assumed to be risk neutral, and their private cost functions are given 
by V(L) and U(/), respectively. V and U are both increasing in their arguments and convex 
We restrict our interest to a linear contract, ay + /?, where a stands for the share of output 
for the tenant, and p stands for the fixed payment for the tenant. The reservation utility for 
the tenant is given by k. Under these settings, the landlord decides whether or not to 
participate in production, and also determines the contract terms. When she decides to 
participate in production, the landlord's effort L is greater than zero; it is zero when she 
decides not to participate in production. It is also assumed that landlord input is not 
necessary in the sense that /(0,/) > 0 for positive 1, but that tenant input is necessary in the 
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sense that /( L ,  0) = 0 for positive L .  This assumption assures tenant participation in 
equilibrium. 
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the landlord decides 
whether or not he/she participates in production and on contract type, simultaneously. Then, 
the landlord makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the tenant. In the second stage, the tenant 
receives the offer, and decides whether or not to take the offer. If the tenant decides to take 
the offer, he/she determines the effort level. In the third stage, the landlord (if he/she decides 
to participate) and tenant exert effort, and they observe the output. 
The landlord's problem is to maximize her expected utility subject to the landlord's 
incentive constraint, the tenant's incentive constraint, and the tenant's participation 
constraint: 
max {(!-<%)/(!,/)-/?-F(l)} 
S.t. 
The landlord's incentive constraint: 
L >  0  
< (l-e)/^ -r'<0 ; 
Z((l-or)/l-r) = 0 
The tenant's incentive constraint: a  f  ( L ,  I )  -  U ' ( l )  =  0; and 
The tenant's participation constraint: a f ( L , l )  +  f t - U ( l ) > k  
We assume that the first order approach is valid in this problem. First, we start by 
investigating the conditions under which the landlord optimally chooses not to participate in 
production, focusing on the cost and productivity of the landlord's effort. 
Proposition 1. When the marginal cost of effort for the landlord is great enough compared 
to the marginal production of effort around L = 0, the landlord optimally chooses not to 
participate in production. 
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Proof. Suppose (1 - a)fL  -  V < 0 in the neighborhood of L = 0 and for any a e [0,1]. Then, 
from the third condition in the landlord's incentive constraint, L must be equal to zero. That 
the second condition in the landlord's incentive constraint holds with strict inequality implies 
that the marginal cost of effort for the landlord is greater than the marginal production of 
effort. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 has intuitive implications. For example, if the landlord lives far from 
the rented land, and thus, the marginal cost of making efforts in production is very high, the 
landlord chooses not to participate in production. For another example, if the landlord has 
only a little experience in farming and the benefit of taking part in production is very low, 
then the landlord chooses not to participate in production. Now we investigate the optimal 
contract type when the landlord chooses not to participate in production. 
Proposition 2. When the landlord does not participate in production (£ =0), then a cash 
rent contract (a =\) is optimal. 
Proof. The landlord problem stated above becomes the following problem, given that the 
landlord does not participate: 
maxUl) - p - V { L ) ]  
a,fi l ' 
S.t. 
The landlord's incentive constraint: 
\r=o 
| [ ( i - r ] ^  < o '  
The tenant's incentive constraint: /* = argmax 
The tenant's participation constraint:max ja f ( £ , l )  +  f 3 - U ( / ) }  >  k  
95 
Because of fi, the participation constraint holds with equality. For now, suppose that the 
second condition in the landlord's incentive constraint holds. Then the above problem 
becomes 
nmx{/(r/)-F(r )-[/(/')-&} 
s.t. 
The landlord's incentive constraint: ll = 0; and 
The tenant's incentive constraint: af,(£,l*)-U' = 0 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
(1) ^ = /(0,r)-F(0)-C/(r)-A; + AM(0,/')-[/') 
where Â is the Lagrangian multiplier for the tenant's incentive constraint. The first order 
condition is 
(2) {fi  ~ U' + k{afn  -  U")} —— + Af t  da 
= 0 
From the tenant's incentive constraint, we have 
(3) f i+(a fu-U")— 
da 
= 0 
Plugging this into the first order condition, and noting that /,-£/' = (1 - a) f,  from the 
tenant's incentive constraint, we have 
(4) 
5/ Since f {  — ^ 0 in general, a* needs to be unity for the above condition to be satisfied. da 
Note that the second condition in the landlord's incentive constraint indeed holds when 
a = 1. Q.E.D. 
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When the marginal cost of landlord effort is so high that the landlord optimally 
chooses not to participate in production, then the landlord problem turns out to be the 
standard principal-agent problem in which the agent (tenant) is risk neutral. Because the 
tenant is risk neutral, a cash rent contract is optimal and there is no incentive cost in order for 
the landlord to elicit the first best effort from the tenant. 
Finally, proposition 3 states that, when the landlord chooses to participate in 
production, then a cropshare contract is optimal. This result is obtained by Bhattacharyya 
and Lafontaine (1995). 
Proposition 3 (Corollary 1 in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995)). When the landlord 
participates in production (ll > 0), then the optimal linear contract is a cropshare contract 
(0 < a* <\) with fixed payment. 
Proof. See the proof of Corollary 1 in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995). 
As the above model shows, the landlord optimally decides whether or not she 
participates in production, and jointly determines the type of contract in accordance with the 
participation decision. The model shows that when the landlord decides not to participate in 
production, then a cash rent contract is chosen; when the landlord decides to participate in 
production, then a cropshare contract is chosen. In the following section, I evaluate the 
model empirically, and suggest which factors actually affect contract choice and landlord 
participation. Summarizing the results above, I obtain the following testable predictions. 
Prediction 1. When the landlord's marginal cost of participation is great enough, or when 
the landlord's marginal production ofparticipation is small enough, then the landlord does 
not participate in production. 
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Prediction 2. PFTzezz z7ze landlord does not participate in production, then a cash rent 
contract is chosen. 
Prediction 3 (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995)). When the landlord participates in 
production, then a cropshare contract is chosen. 
Empirical Analysis 
Data set 
I use the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) for the 
empirical analysis of the predictions above. AELOS is a comprehensive data set consisting 
of tenants' demographic information, economic attributes and household characteristics, and 
landlords' demographic information and economic attributes. The survey questionnaires 
were first sent to producers/tenants all over the United States. They were asked to answer a 
set of questions and to provide the addresses and names of their landlords. Then 
questionnaires were sent to those listed landlords. This procedure has made it possible for us 
to identify a tenant and a landlord for every contract in the data set. In the United States, a 
tenant usually has more than one landlord. Reflecting this fact, the information for a tenant 
may appear more than once in our data set, but in combination with the information for 
different landlords. In other words, in our data set, the sample unit of the data is not an 
individual tenant or landlord, but a contract between a tenant and a landlord. After deleting 
unusable observations, we have a total of 44,515 observations (contracts) in our data set. A 
more detailed description of the data set is provided by Fukunaga and Huffman (2006). 
Empirical method 
Using table 1,1 start with reevaluating the likelihood of landlord participation in management 
decisions under cash renting and sharecropping. According to prediction 2 and prediction 3, 
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if the landlord provides input, then the contract should always be cropshare; if the landlord 
does not provide input, then the contract should always be cash rent. Table 1 shows that 
landlords more often participate in management decisions under sharecropping than under 
cash renting. If I interpret the landlord participation in management decisions as the landlord 
provision of input, the fact that landlords more often participate in management decisions 
under sharecropping than under cash renting seems consistent with the predictions of the 
model above. However, the facts are that about 13% of landlords who use cash rent contracts 
participate in management decisions and that about 74% of landlords who use cropshare do 
not participate in management decisions, which are not consistent with the prediction that the 
contract should be always cropshare when the landlord provides input. The result indicates 
that there may be factors other than those explained in the above model that affect contract 
and landlord participation decisions. In the following analysis, I investigate the causal 
factors that affect contract and landlord participation decisions, using regression analysis. 
According to the three predictions above, greater marginal cost of effort and smaller 
marginal product of effort reduce the likelihood of cropshare, while greater marginal cost of 
effort and smaller marginal product of effort reduce the likelihood of landlord participation. 
Analytically, the landlord's decision rule that is directly derived from the model above is 
represented as follows. 
cropshare = 0, if [fL - V']L=0 ^ 0 
cropshare = 1, if \fL - V']L=Q > 0 
r=o,if[/t-r]I=o<o 
L'>0,i([fL-V] l = o>0 
, where 
cropshare = 1, if cropshare 
cropshare = 0, if cash rent 
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Econometricians do not observe the term [ fL  -  V']L = 0  •  Therefore, I need to find a proxy 
variable for this term. As proxies for marginal cost and benefit of landlord participation, I 
use dummy variables indicating whether or not the landlord lives on the contracted land, 
whether or not the landlord lives close to the land, whether or not the landlord operated a 
farm or a ranch in 1999, and the landlord's age, in addition to other landlord and tenant 
demographic attributes. Landlords who live on the contracted land or live close to the land 
would have a lower marginal cost of effort, because they can easily access information useful 
for decision making, such as soil conditions, weather, and tenant actions, at lower cost. 
Therefore, they should be more likely to participate in management decisions, and use 
cropshare. I use a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the landlord operated a farm 
or a ranch as a proxy for either marginal cost or marginal product of landlord effort. 
Landlords who have farming experience would be less hesitant to participate in management 
decisions because they would be more confident about their decisions, which would decrease 
the marginal cost of landlord effort. Or landlords who have farming experience could make 
timely and useful management decisions, which would increase the marginal product of 
landlord effort. Either way, landlords who have farming experience will be more likely to 
participate in management decisions, increasing the likelihood of crop sharing. The 
landlord's age is a proxy for the landlord's entrepreneurial skills, although it maybe 
positively correlated with the cost of landlord participation. Although greater landlord's 
entrepreneurial skills should increase the likelihoods of cropshare and landlord participation, 
greater cost of landlord participation should decrease the likelihoods. Therefore, the 
predicted sign of this variable can be either positive or negative. Table 2 summarizes the 
definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
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Because Z* is not observable either, I also need a proxy for it. I use dummy 
variables that indicate who makes managerial decisions: the landlord (or a professional farm 
manager hired by the landlord), the tenant, or both. The category of managerial decisions 
includes the selection of crop varieties or livestock breeds, the selection of fertilizer and 
chemicals, harvesting decisions, and cultivation practices. I assume that landlords can 
participate in production only through participating in decision making2. This assumption 
implies that, if the landlord participates in managerial decisions, Z* is greater than zero. 
Analytically, the assumption can be written as follows: 
f decision -1, if Z* > 0 , [decision = 1, if landlord participates in decision (6) < , where \ [decision = 0, ifZ =0 [decision = 0, otherwise 
I try two different proxies for the landlord participation variable. Since my major interest is 
in whether the landlord's input, Z*, is greater than zero or equal to zero, I first use a dummy 
variable that is equal to one when the landlord either solely or jointly makes decisions, and 
zero when the landlord makes no decisions, solely or jointly. Secondly, I define a dummy 
variable for each management category that is equal to one when the landlord either solely or 
jointly makes the specific decision, and zero when the landlord does not make the decision. 
Because the decisions are highly correlated with each other, as table 3 shows, the first 
specification may be reasonable. 
As pointed out above, factors other than marginal cost and benefit of the landlord 
input may affect contract and landlord participation decisions. Risk and transaction costs are 
examples of possible factors that may affect contract and landlord participation choices. In 
the empirical analysis, I also attempt to capture the effects of the factors that are not 
explicitly dealt with in the model above. I denote the vector of factors that contains proxies 
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for the marginal cost and benefit of the landlord input as X, the vector of factors other than 
the marginal cost and benefit of landlord input that could affect contract choice as Z,, and 
the vector of factors other than the marginal cost and benefit of landlord input that could 
affect contract choice as Z2. Zl and Z2 contain regional dummies, the tenant's age, the 
tenant's farm type dummies, the number of landlords with whom the tenant contracts, the 
tenant's total assets, the market value of land and buildings on the contracted land, the 
county-level yield variability index, the county-level average Beale code, and the county-
level erodibility index. The tenant's age may be used as a proxy for the tenant's 
entrepreneurial skills. Because the tenant is likely to accumulate entrepreneurial skills as 
he/she gets older, the selection hypothesis (Hallagan, 1978) would predict that older tenants 
are more likely to use cash rental contracts. The hypothesis would predict that the sign of the 
estimated coefficient for the tenant's age in the contract choice equation is negative and that 
in the landlord participation equation it is negative. The tenant's total assets and the market 
value of land and buildings on the contracted land can be used as proxies for the tenant's and 
landlord's risk preferences, respectively; one who has greater assets is less risk averse. The 
county-level yield variability index is correlated with the risk involved in production. The 
risk sharing hypothesis predicts that cropshare is more likely as the tenant becomes more risk 
averse, the landlord becomes less risk averse, and/or the risk involved in the transaction 
becomes greater. Thus, the risk sharing hypothesis predicts that, in the contract choice 
equation, the coefficient estimate for the tenant's total assets is negative, the coefficient 
estimate for the landlord's total value is positive, and the coefficient estimate for the county-
level yield variability is positive. The county-level average Beale code and the county-level 
erodibility index can be used as proxies for transaction costs. If the contract is in a county 
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with a greater average Beale code value, the contracted land as agricultural land tends to be 
more important. If the county-level erodibility index is high, maintenance of land quality 
becomes more important. These factors are likely to affect both contract choice and landlord 
participation. As mentioned earlier, Dubois (2002) argues that cropshare is more likely when 
the contracted land is subject to high risk of land overuse, given that the landlord cannot 
observe the tenant action at all. Thus, in a situation in which the landlord decides contract 
type only and cannot participate in production, both the county-level average Beale code and 
the county-level erodibility index should increase the likelihood of cropshare. However, 
without formalization it is difficult to derive testable predictions as to the effect of transaction 
costs when the landlord can participate in production. The formalization of the argument is 
left for future research, and I do not derive predictions as to the effect of transaction costs on 
landlord participation in this article. 
Finally, although the term [ fL - V]L=Q is not a linear function in general, I use a 
linear approximation for the proxies for this term [ fL - V']L=Q because the variables in which 
I am most interested are dummy variables. I also assume that other factors enter the 
landlord's decision rule in a linear fashion. Then the regressions I actually estimate are 
represented as follows: 
cropshare = 0, if Xf3x + Z,/, - s x  < 0 
cropshare = 1, if Xfix + Z{fx - ex > 0 (7) s 
decision = 0, if X fi2 + Z2y2 - s2 < 0 
decision = 1, i f  X/32+ Z2y2  -s2>0 
Because X, Z,, and Z2 may be correlated, I allow the coefficients for X in the contract choice 
and participation equations to differ. Furthermore, I assume Z, = Z2, because I do not have a 
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priori reasons that the factors affecting contract choice differ from those affecting landlord 
participation. The disturbance terms s] and e2 capture determinants of contract and 
participation decisions that are not observable for econometricians. I allow the disturbance 
terms f, and s2 to be correlated, because the proxies imperfectly substitute for true variables 
in the regression, and the factors that affect both contract and participation choices may enter 
the disturbance terms. Other factors that can affect both contract and participation decisions 
include savings in self-employment taxes and receipt of full social security payments (Hardin, 
2004; Harrison, 2004). If landlords "materially participate" in production, the income from 
the transaction is subject to self-employment tax3. Under cropshare, in which the income for 
the landlord depends on the realized outcome and the landlord materially participates in 
production, the income is subject to self-employment tax. Under cash rent, since the income 
does not depend on the realized outcome, the income is not subject to self-employment tax. 
This may motivate landlords to use cash rent and not to participate in production. In addition, 
prior to 2000, landlords aged 65 and older on social security were required to count material 
participation income or other earned income toward the maximum amount of income that 
they could earn before social security benefits were reduced. The income from cash rent is 
generally unearned income and thus was not counted toward the maximum amount of 
income that they could earn before social security benefits were reduced. This may have also 
motivated landlords to use cash rent and not to participate in production. On the other hand, 
landlords have to materially participate in farming for at least five years before death to be 
eligible for estate tax reduction. This may motivate landlords to cropshare and participate in 
production. All of these factors are captured in the disturbance terms. For all of these 
reasons, I use a bivariate discrete choice model. A bivariate probit model is appropriate if the 
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disturbance terms follow a standardized bivariate normal distribution. This seems like a 
reasonable assumption. 
Results 
Table 4 presents the regression results from fitting a bivariate probit of contract choice and 
landlord participation in any decision. In table 4,1 find some evidence for the double-sided 
moral hazard hypothesis. If the landlord lives on the contracted land, she is more likely to 
participate in decisions, which is consistent with the model. In addition, if the landlord 
operated a farm or a ranch in 1999, then she is more likely to use a cropshare contract and 
participate in decisions, which provides more supporting evidence for the model. Landlord 
age, used as a proxy for the landlord's entrepreneurial skills, increases the likelihood of 
cropshare as it increases, while it decreases the likelihood of landlord participation. As I 
mentioned above, landlord age is likely to be positively correlated with both the landlord's 
marginal productivity and cost; this result does not contradict the double-sided moral hazard 
hypothesis. On the other hand, if the landlord lives on the contracted land or lives within 5 
miles of the contracted land, then a cropshare contract is less likely, and the coefficient 
estimate in the landlord participation equation is insignificant. This contradicts the 
prediction of the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis. 
Other results in table 4 suggest that factors other than double-sided moral hazard 
affect contract and landlord decision choices. The coefficient estimate for tenant age in the 
contract choice equation has a consistent sign, while in the landlord participation equation it 
is not significant. Tenant age, used as a proxy for the tenant's entrepreneurial skills, 
decreases the likelihood of cropshare, but it does not affect landlord participation 
significantly. This result does not provide strong support for the selection hypothesis. The 
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tenant's total assets, which can be used as a proxy for the tenant risk preference, and the 
county-level yield variability index significantly affect contract choice. Tenants who have 
greater total assets, and thus are less risk averse, are less likely to use cropshare. Greater 
yield variability increases the likelihood of cropshare. These results are consistent with the 
risk sharing hypothesis of contract choice. The county-level erodibility index, a proxy for the 
sensitivity of land for land overuse, significantly increases the likelihood of cropshare. This 
result is consistent with the pure transaction cost hypothesis of contract choice developed by 
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) and Dubois (2002). The county-level average Beale 
code, a proxy for the importance of land for agricultural usage, also affects contract choice: 
the more important for agricultural usage the land is, the more likely cropshare will be used. 
This result is also consistent with the pure transaction cost hypothesis. 
Interestingly, these factors related to risk and transaction costs affect landlord 
participation, also. As the county-level erodibility index and the county-level average Beale 
code become greater, the landlord is more likely to participate in management decisions. 
This implies that landlords are more likely to be involved in management decisions when 
land overuse is an important issue. As the county-level yield variability increases, the 
landlord is less likely to participate in decisions. This result indicates that landlords are less 
likely to be involved in management decisions under more risky environments. Thus, risk, 
risk preference, and transaction costs affect both contract and landlord participation decisions. 
Finally, the estimated correlation of the disturbance terms across the two equations 
is positive and significant. This implies that contract and landlord participation decisions are 
correlated in a way such that unobservable factors increase the likelihood of cropshare and 
landlord participation, even after some factors related to productivity and cost of landlord and 
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tenant effort, risk, risk preferences, and transaction costs are controlled. These results 
indicate that various factors affect contract and landlord participation choices jointly. The 
simple prediction based on the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis that landlord 
participation in decisions accompanies cropshare does not explain all of the empirical 
findings, although some evidence is found. 
Conclusions 
I develop a simple model of double-sided moral hazard that explains the relationship between 
contract and landlord participation decisions. Based on the predictions from the model, I 
empirically evaluate the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis, using the 1999 Agricultural 
Economics and Land Ownership Survey. I find some empirical evidence for the double-
sided moral hazard hypothesis. Moreover, I find there are other factors, in addition to the 
costs and benefits of landlord participation, that affect contract choice and landlord 
participation. Most importantly, there is evidence that contract choice and landlord 
participation are correlated, and various factors (e.g., risk, transaction costs, and tax benefits) 
exist that affect the two decisions. This implies that contract design is not just a matter of 
designing a monetary compensation scheme, but involves landlord participation and 
interactively deals with the possibly complicated objectives. 
There are several suggestions for future research. First, for evaluating the double-
sided moral hazard hypothesis more closely, it will be useful to analyze the relationship 
between the share rate (or royalty rate, in franchising) and landlord participation as in 
Lafontaine (1992). It is not feasible in this article because I do not have data on the share 
rate. Second, in this article, testing the double-sided moral hazard hypothesis against the 
selection hypothesis is difficult. It is difficult to distinguish the hypotheses using the proxy 
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variables, because the predictions for the signs of the coefficient estimates for the landlord's 
productivity and the tenant's productivity based on the double-sided hypothesis coincide with 
those based on the selection hypothesis. It would be interesting to evaluate the selection 
hypothesis, perhaps by directly investigating whether or not such a selection actually occurs 
in practice. Third, tax benefits are likely to play an important role in contract and landlord 
participation decisions, and thus, more careful attention should be paid to assessing the effect. 
Due to lack of data on the tax benefits that landlords may receive, there have been no studies 
in the academic literature, to my knowledge, that address the role of tax benefits in contract 
and landlord participation decisions. Finally, it seems important to consider the role of risk 
and transaction costs in the joint decision of contract type and landlord participation, as the 
empirical results indicate. A dynamic model in which the landlord and tenant are both 
assumed to be risk averse and the landlord makes contract and participation decisions over 
time may be an appropriate way of formalizing the argument. 
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Endnotes 
1 Unlike the allocation of decision rights and principal participation, matching may not be 
intentionally used in contract design. However, it could still endogenously affect contract 
terms. 
2 This is a strong assumption, because landlords may participate in production through 
channels other than decision making, such as monitoring, investment in land, and putting 
restrictions on tenant activities. Investigation of the role of these factors in contract design is 
beyond the scope of this article, and remains to be done in future studies. Furthermore, 
endogenous matching between landlord and tenant attributes may affect contract and landlord 
participation decisions (Ackerberg and Boticcini, 2003; Serfes, 2005). Fukunaga and 
Huffman (2006), using AELOS, find that endogenous matching does not change the 
qualitative result in the contract choice equation in the data set. Since I use the same data set 
in this article, I do not model endogenous matching in the empirical analysis, based on the 
result of Fukunaga and Huffman (2006). 
3 A landlord is materially participating if he/she has an arrangement with the tenant for 
landlord participation and the landlord meets one of the four following tests (Hardin, 2004): 
Test No. 1. The landlord does any three of the following: 1) advance, pay, or stand good for 
at least half the direct cost of producing the crop; 2) furnish at least half the tools, equipment, 
and livestock used in producing the crop; 3) consult with the tenant; and 4) inspect the 
production activities periodically. 
Test No. 2. The landlord regularly and frequently makes, or takes an important part in making, 
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management decisions substantially contributing to or affecting the success of the enterprise. 
Test No. 3. The landlord works 100 hours or more, spread over a period of five weeks or 
more, in activities connected with crop production. 
Test No. 4. The landlord does things that, considered in their total effect, show that he/she is 
materially and significantly involved in the production of the farm commodities. 
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Table 1. The Likelihood of Landlord Participation in Farming 
Decisions by Contract Type: The 1999 AELOS Data, N = 44,515 
Any Decisions Fertilizer Crop Variety/ Livestock Breed 
Cultivation 
Practice Harvesting 
Cash Rent 12.8 10.2 10.0 10.4 9.0 
Cropshare 25.9 20.6 20.7 18.2 16.9 
I l l  
Table 2. Symbols, Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Definition Mean S.D. Min Max 
cropshare =1 if cropshare, =0 if cash rent 0.20 0.40 0 1 
decision =1 if landlord at least partly participates in any decision making 0.15 0.36 0 1 
fertilizer =1 if landlord participates in deciding type of fertilizer and other chemicals 0.12 0.33 0 1 
seed =1 if landlord participates in deciding variety/breed of crop/livestock 0.12 0.33 0 1 
cultivation =1 if landlord participates in deciding cultivation practice 0.12 0.32 0 1 
harvest =1 if landlord participates in deciding harvesting 0.11 0.31 0 1 
NER =1 if location of the tenant's farm is Northwest region 0.13 0.33 0 1 
MWR =1 if location of the tenant's farm is Midwest region 0.37 0.48 0 1 
SR =1 if location of the tenant's farm is South region 0.34 0.47 0 1 
grain_oil =1 if type of tenant's farm is grain and/or oilseed production 0.39 0.49 0 1 
tobacco cotton =1 if type of tenant's farm is tobacco and/or cotton production 0.12 0.33 0 1 
vegetableJruit =1 if type of tenant's farm is vegetable and/or fruit production 0.08 0.27 0 1 
beef =1 if type of tenant's farm is beef 0.10 0.30 0 1 
dairy =1 if type of tenant's farm is dairy 0.15 0.36 0 1 
otherjmimal =1 if type of tenant's farm is producing other types of animals 0.17 0.37 0 1 
t_age age of tenant 51.61 12.13 18 96 
tjijandlords number of landlords tenant contracts with 13.36 19.78 1 171 
t_total_asset value of tenant's total assets ($100,000) 23.75 67.39 0.00 5528.50 
l_age age of landlord 65.05 14.47 2 100 
l_liv_onJarm =1 if landlord lives on contracted land 0.13 0.34 0 1 
IJivclose =1 if l_liv_on Jarm =0 and landlord resides within 5 miles of contracted land 0.42 0.49 0 1 
l_ope_99 =1 if landlord operated farm or ranch in 1999 0.11 0.32 0 1 
totalvalue market value of land and buildings on contracted land ($100,000) 2.76 9.54 0.00 584.33 
erodibility erodibility index for county of tenant's residence 2.69 2.71 0.00 29.14 
variability standardized and weighted yield variability for county of tenant's residence 0.26 0.10 0.00 1.29 
average beale average of Beale code in 1993 and 2003 for county of tenant's residence 4.74 2.48 0.50 9.00 
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Table 3. Correlations among Landlord's Participation in Tenant's Farm Production 
Decisions (participation is indicated by a 1 and nonparticipation by a 0): The 1999 
AELOS Data, N = 44,515 
fertilizer seed cultivation harvest 
fertilizer 1.00 0.84 0.86 0.86 
seed 1.00 0.84 0.85 
cultivation 1.00 0.86 
harvest 1.00 
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Table 4. MLE Bivariate Probit Estimates of Contract Choice (cropshare = 1) and 
Landlord Participation in Tenant's Production Decisions (decision = 1), N = 44,515 
Cropshare Chosen Landlord Paticipates 
-Loglikelihood = 37308.5 
Intercept -0.9090*** -0.9101*** 
NER 
MWR 
SR 
-1.2578*** 
-0.5351*** 
-0.3932*** 
-0.1362*** 
-0.0494** 
-0.1581*** 
grain_oil 
tobacco_cotton 
vegetableJruit 
beef 
dairy 
other animal 
0.3635*** 
0.0100 
-0.2364*** 
-0.1161*** 
-0.6953*** 
-0.2695*** 
0.1776*** 
0.0759** 
0.0495 
0.1188*** 
0.6953*** 
0.1120*** 
t_n_landlords 
t total asset 
-0.0011* 
-0.0054*** 
-0.0061*** 
0.0009 
-0.0024*** 
<0.0001 
l_liv_on _farm 
l_liv_close 
l_ope_99 
total value 
0.0041*** 
-0.1022*** 
-0.2107*** 
0.0662*** 
<0.0001 
-0.0038*** 
0.2464*** 
0.0262 
0.4233*** 
0.0023*** 
erodibility 
variability 
average_beale 
0.0788*** 
0.5384*** 
0.0289*** 
0.0127*** 
-0.4191*** 
0.0104*** 
Correlation in Disturbance 0.2894*** 
Note: Three asterisks indicate the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. Two 
asterisks indicate the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level. One asterisk 
indicates the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level. 
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CHAPTERS. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I have studied farmland lease contracts in U.S. agriculture. Using the 
data from the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey, I investigated the 
empirical determinants of contract design from the perspective of the principal-agent 
framework, which emphasizes the role of incentives in contract design. In the empirical 
analyses, I found evidence that incentives indeed play an important role in contract design. 
In chapter 2,1 investigated the role of risk, transaction costs, and endogenous matching 
between the landlord and tenant in contract choice. I found that both risk and transaction 
costs affect contract choice. Furthermore, I found evidence supporting endogenous matching 
between the landlord and tenant, and found that the matching is likely to affect contract 
choice. In chapter 3,1 investigated whether contractual externalities exist in farmland lease 
practice in modern U.S. agriculture, and found some evidence that contractual externalities 
indeed exist and are likely to affect contract choice. I argued that landlords non-
cooperatively act and choose contract type due to contractual externalities. This leads to 
inefficient competition between landlords contracting with a given tenant and greater 
likelihood of cash rental contracts. In chapter 4,1 investigated the link between contract 
choice and landlord participation decision from the perspective of the double-sided moral 
hazard hypothesis. I found some evidence to support the hypothesis, and furthermore, I 
found that other factors, including risk and transaction costs, are likely to affect contract 
choice and landlord participation decision jointly. 
While I believe that each of the chapters above makes unique contributions to the 
literature, this dissertation as a whole delivers an important conclusion: in farmland lease 
contracts in the United States, contract design is not just a matter of designing monetary 
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compensation schemes or reducing transactions costs in accordance with the incentives in 
bilateral relationships, but involves various incentive devices (e.g., matching between 
landlords and tenants and landlord's participation in tenant's production decisions) in a way 
that the landlords can optimally coordinate incentives in multilateral relationships. 
Compared to the literature on farmland lease contracts that has principally dealt with the 
problem of designing monetary compensation scheme in bilateral relationships, I showed 
contract design in farmland tenancy related contracting is relatively complex. 
Contract design in practice, however, is even more complicated. For example, 
landlord frequently monitor tenants' behavior, they sometimes use professional farm 
managers, they set various lengths to lease contracts, they choice between oral and written 
contracts, landlord's and tenant's investment in land maintenance, etc. and all of these 
actions seem to affect farmland lease practices, and there is some evidence that these factors 
also affect contract choice. In this dissertation, I could not address everything. Hence, much 
related research remains to be done. 
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